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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The three following lectures form the fifth series delivered
at the University of Illinois on a foundation established in
1935 by Mrs. George E. Frazer of Winnetka, Illinois, as a
memorial to her father, the late Edmund Janes James, Presi-
dent of the University from 1904 to 1920. Under the terms
of the gift the lecturers are chosen by a committee selected
from the professors of political science and economics.
The first series of lectures, published in 1938, included a
"Biographical Note on President James," by Evarts B. Greene,
Professor of History at Columbia University (formerly Pro-
fessor of History and Dean of the College of Literature and
Arts at the University of Illinois), and lectures on: "The
American State University: A Problem in Political Science,"
by Herman G. James, President of Ohio University; "Public
Service and the University Graduate," by Leonard D. White,
Member of the United States Civil Service Commission and
Professor of Public Administration, University of Chicago;
and "The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Na-
tion," by Robert E. Cushman, Professor of Government,
Cornell University.
The second series, published in 1941, included lectures on:
"The Constitution in Transition," by Thomas Reed Powell,
Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; "The Com-
promise Principle in Politics," by T. V. Smith, Congressman-
at-Large from Illinois and Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Chicago; and "Historical Foundations for a
Democratic China," by Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to
the United States.
The third series, published in 1944, included lectures on:
"Post-War Planning," by Charles E. Merriam, Professor of
Political Science, University of Chicago, and Member of
the National Resources Planning Board; "Democracy and the
Manpower Crisis," by Clarence A. Dykstra, President of the
University of Wisconsin and first Director of Selective Serv-
ice ; and "Democratic Ideals: London, Ottawa, Wellington,
Canberra, Washington," by Allan Nevins, Professor of His-
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tory, Columbia University, and then recently returned from
an extensive war mission to Australia and New Zealand.
The fourth series, published in 1947, included lectures on:
"The Strategy and Politics of Raw Materials in Peace and
War," by William Yandell Elliott, Professor of Government
in Harvard University and then Vice-Chairman of the War
Production Board ; "Disputes before Organs of the United
Nations," by Manley O. Hudson, Bemis Professor of Inter-
national Law, Harvard Law School, and formerly Judge of
the Permanent Court of International Justice ; "Force or
Persuasion in International Relations," by Herman Finer,
Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, and
Sometime Consultant, International Labor Organization.
The lectures in the fifth series have also been given by men
distinguished for scholarly ability and for practical experi-
ence in public affairs. Their publication has been made possible
by the cooperation of the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs. It is hoped that these lectures will be of value in
stimulating interest in the problems of government.
Clarence A. Berdahl
H. M. Gray
Charles M. Kneier
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WHAT DO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
WANT FROM THEIR POLITICIANS?

WHAT DO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
WANT FROM THEIR POLITICIANS? 1
By Wayne Morse
United States Senator from Oregon
It is an enjoyable honor for me to return to an academic en-
vironment and discuss with you tonight some problems of
political ethics. For some twenty years I lived and taught in an
academic environment where, as you well know, the motivat-
ing drives are a search for the facts and a teaching of the
truth as the facts found in academic research develop the truth.
I regret to say that the political environment of America, par-
ticularly in Washington, D.C., bears little resemblance to an
academic environment. The yardstick of cause and effect
reasoning which measures the findings of truth as products of
academic research in both the social and pure sciences, as well
as for that matter in the arts, is very frequently laid aside by
the professional politician. He cannot afford to permit the
principles of logic or the disclosures of fact to direct his vote
on any issue if such a vote would run counter to the preju-
dices or selfish economic interests of pressure groups which
were powerful enough to elect, him and which he knows may
be powerful enough to defeat him for re-election. Then, too,
there is party policy which requires mumbo-jumbo party
loyalty from the professional politician, with the result that the
master voice of the machine boss serves as a nerve block to
independence of judgment on the merits of issues.
Granted that political science is not a pure science because
of the fact that so many of the impurities of human nature
pollute the stream of American politics ; nevertheless, I venture
to suggest that a more realistic and functional teaching of
government and politics in the high schools and colleges of
America would help build a much needed political sewage dis-
posal system for protecting the health of American democracy.
1
Delivered April 28, 1948.
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It is no flattery when I say that here at the University of
Illinois you have built a deserved reputation in political science,
law, and the social sciences generally for leading the students
into a more realistic understanding of the differences between
democratic government in theory and politics in practice;
between Hamiltonian theories of political aristocracy and
Jeffersonian theories of human rights; between the static
constitution of John Marshall and the dynamic constitution of
Holmes and Brandeis; between the exploitation by a laissez-
faire economy and the paramount duty of a representative
government to promote the general welfare by protecting the
weak from the exploitation of the strong.
The Edmund J. James Lectures on Government are but
one exhibit among many in evidence of the program of this
great university to introduce its students to the realisms of
democractic government. In preparation of this lecture, I read
the several series of James lectures which Professor Clarence
A. Berdahl so thoughtfully sent to me. They constitute an ex-
cellent seminar reading and discussion course in Political Prob-
lems. They are a living scholastic monument to the memory of
Edmund J. James and a deserved tribute to his educational
statesmanship. His daughter, Mrs. George E. Frazer, through
her endowment of this lecture chair in government, has hon-
ored not only the memory of her distinguished father but has
carried forward his faith that democratic processes in America
will be secure and effective only so long as there is public
understanding and enlightenment concerning them.
The subject question which I raise in this lecture, "What
do the American people want from their politicians?" can be
answered in many ways. The wisecracker might answer, "Too
much," and not be wrong. Or he might answer, "The impos-
sible," and still be right. The blind partisan who prejudiciously
thinks that every detail of the party's program is synonymous
with the national welfare might answer, and probably would,
"Complete party regularity." How well I know that answer!
How unsound I also know it to be ! Unsound first because no
party platform hatched from the hot incubator hotel rooms
of political convention compromises and deals can be expected
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always to place the ideals of self-government by a free people
under a written constitution above political expediency and
prejudiced appeals to very much needed blocs of votes. Hotly
contested campaigns waged at political conventions by power-
ful and ambitious supporters of candidates for the presidential
nomination frequently permit little consideration of principles
of political idealism when it comes to adopting a party
platform.
"Party regularity" is an unsound answer to the question in
the second place because the American people who vote, in-
cluding both registered party members and independent voters,
indicate time and time again that they do not approve of poli-
ticians placing "party regularity" above the public's best in-
terests. An examination of the voting returns in most northern
states in recent elections will show not only that independent
voters give greatest emphasis to what the individual candidate
stands for, but that even a majority of the registered party
voters of both major parties with increasing frequency have
scratched their ballots in accordance with their views of the
man rather than their views of his party label. This attitude
of the public creates many problems for political parties, but it
is one of the political realities which both major parties need
to remember when they come to write their political plat-
forms. They need to remember that the American voters are
wise to political platform sophistry and hypocrisy. They need
to remember that the forces of political education, the impact
on our people of world events with all their implications for
the future, the strains and stresses of our complex living prob-
lems, the fears and sense of insecurity that are gnawing at the
hearts of most Americans these days leave little patience for
political platitudes.
It is solutions to specific problems and issues which
the American people want from their politicians. It is less
politics and more statesmanship which the people want. It
is an exercise of honest independence of judgment on the
merits of issues in accordance with the facts as they pre-
sent themselves on specific issues that the American people
want from their politicians. It is reasoning from cause to effect
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rather than buck-passing ability and rationalization which
the people want.
They are sick and tired of being told that depressions are
part of the price we pay for liberty, because they know it need
not be so if more politicians would represent the people rather
than the special interests which are still powerful enough in
America to elect many men to office. The people know that
there is no excuse for so many millions of our homeless being
priced out of owning a home or being forced to pay triple
prices for shacks that frequently are not as well constructed
as chicken houses on a modern poultry farm. They know that
the inflation boom which has turned the American dollar into
a fifty-cent piece, based on 1939 values, could have been and
still could be checked in part by a Congress willing to recog-
nize that free enterprise does not mean license for the owners
of capital and sources of production to profiteer at the expense
of the many as the result of a short supply created by an un-
balanced war economy. The people are disturbed by the en-
croachments by powerful economic interests which are able
to force through the Congress laws which transgress the in-
alienable rights set forth in the Constitution. The people are
beginning to see that many politicians are rationalizing legis-
lation which invades the realm of inalienable rights by trying
to convince the American people that the economic welfare,
the complex industrial system, the material comforts, and the
uninterrupted production of the country justify and make
reasonable a limiting of inalienable rights. This materialistic
approach to democracy is creating great tensions in our body
politic. Many people are disturbed. Resentment is growing.
All is not well in our democracy. Politicians and our political
parties need to take heed of the fact that as the American
people have risen in defense of inalienable human rights
embodied in the spiritual values of democracy as epitomized
in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution when
those rights were endangered by totalitarianism abroad, so too
will they in due course of time repudiate any attempt to trans-
gress those rights through government by the privileged few
at home. We are witnessing in America today a resurgence of
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Hamiltonianism and a suppression of Jeffersonianism. It is
not surprising that economic dislocations, inflationary prices,
failure as yet to win the peace, labor excesses, monopolistic
profiteering, inequitable taxes, Russian aggression, growing
class conscious conflicts at home and abroad, the danger of
another war, and on every hand the manifestations of greed
and selfishness have left the average voter perplexed, disil-
lusioned, and sick at heart over politics and politicians. It is
to be expected that in such a period of social and political
flux our people generally should be routed a bit from holding
fast to an abiding faith in the spiritual values of democracy.
However, the politicians and our political parties will make a
grievous mistake if they interpret the hysteria of the moment
for crystallized public opinion on the basic issues of the day.
In due course of time they will be repudiated at the polls if
so many of our politicians continue to look on democracy as a
form of government motivated by values of materialism rather
than by human rights.
They will discover that the American people will never
endure any form of economic fascism or any form of com-
munism because the people know that economic fascism, even
by Big Business, and any form of communism, even by a class-
conscious third party in America, will mean the end to per-
sonal liberty. The Lincoln view of the superiority of human
rights over property rights is no political cliche in our Amer-
ican ideology of representative self-government. Any sacrifice
of individual freedom to the economic advantage of the owners
of property or to the economic comfort of the general public
strikes at the roots of the inalienable personal rights set forth
in our Constitution. We cannot have those rights and eat them,
too. We cannot respect them only when it is economically ad-
vantageous to do so and still preserve them. Lip service of
praise for individual liberty, followed by legislation which
sets forth procedures so restrictive in nature as to make ef-
fective exercise of individual liberty impossible, will never
check encroachments upon the democratic way of life.
For a time, millions of dollars spent for propaganda in
stirring up public opinion against some group within our
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society, which through lack of self-discipline and statesman-
like leadership has seriously injured the public through un-
justifiable excesses, will result in the passage of unnecessarily
extreme legislation. For a time, special interest groups riding
the crest of public indignation, much of which they have helped
create by propaganda techniques, can awe a Congress into
passing extreme punitive legislation for the handling of social
and economic problems.
The Taft-Hartley law is the product of government by
propaganda and pressure. It relates to the subject of labor ex-
cesses, in which field some legislation was needed. Too many
in labor had forgotten or were willing to trample on the dem-
ocratic principle that one's individual rights are relative in that
they must bear a non-transgressing relationship to equal in-
dividual rights of other persons. However, as time passes,
more and more people will see that what was needed was not
punitive legislation but legislation which sought to balance the
interests and rights of labor and employers and thereby protect
the best interests of the public. Legislation was needed which
fitted into the framework of voluntarism in recognition of the
fact that the economic and social problems of wages, hours,
conditions of employment, pensions, job security, production
output, and the many other facets of free collective bargaining
are not basically legal issues at all. What was needed was a
Congress which recognized that any law which attempts by
the punitive force of government to force either free workers
or free employers into a governmentally dictated economic
mold is more than likely to endanger the inalienable rights of
the individual.
Is it any wonder then that concern is growing throughout
the nation over the problems and methods which government
must use to enforce the Taft-Hartley law? Is it any wonder
that those employers who recognize in increasing numbers that
collective bargaining is here to stay are becoming more uneasy
month by month over the implications of the Taft-Hartley
law? It will take time, much time, possibly too much time for
people generally to comprehend fully the limitations on in-
dividual liberty not only of the worker but of the employer,
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too, which are encompassed in the Taft-Hartley law. It will
probably take a decade, but during that decade an old historical
pattern will be woven once again into the tapestry of our na-
tional life. It will be the pattern of resentment. It will depict
again that free men will struggle even against odds to prevent
the government from becoming the master instead of the
servant. We are yet too close to this new struggle to appreciate
the costly price we have paid for the Taft-Hartley bill. If we
should suffer a depression, if unemployment should stalk our
streets again, if the civil war within the house of labor
should end, if a chain of events such as those which crystallized
labor unity after the Haymarket riots and which eventually
led to the Norris-LaGuardia Act should repeat themselves, the
public would soon understand that the Taft-Hartley law is
based on a principle of government by force in a field of
economic and social relations where voluntarism is the essence
of government by law. Industrial peace is much to be desired.
Uninterrupted production should be the goal of management
and labor. They should recognize that it is their mutual ob-
ligation to maintain uninterrupted production, and maximum
production at that, through good-faith collective bargaining
based on the give-and-take of fair-play voluntarism, conscion-
able compromise, and peaceful procedures free of compulsory
dictates of government. They should not ignore the fact that
excesses of either labor or management or both always give
rise to the danger of extreme legislation.
However, the public has responsibilities in the field of in-
dustrial controversy, too. The public's elected representatives
should give voice to those responsibilities and stand up against
waves of public indignation which seek to express themselves
in demands for legislation that encroaches on constitutional
guarantees or is so extreme in nature as to intensify class
conscious feelings. Congress did not counsel calmness and
reasonableness when it passed the Taft-Hartley law. It did
not think through its proposals for enforcement and admin-
istration. It did not weigh the implications of throwing on the
common law courts of the country, in the last analysis, the
burden of attempting to settle, as though they were questions
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of law, the highly social and economic problems of industrial
relations.
I find it rather amusing to note the growing irritation in
Congress among those who voted for the Taft-Hartley law
when their attention is called to criticisms of the law by in-
creasing numbers of employers who are beginning to see that
they were sold a pig in a poke. In recent weeks I have noted
that an increasing number of members of Congress are hedg-
ing a little on the Taft-Hartley law and are beginning to
suggest that maybe it needs not some slight but some basic
revisions. They are concerned about the increasing number of
scholarly analyses of the Taft-Hartley law which are pointing
out the danger of the law's re-establishing government by in-
junction in this country.
They have no satisfactory answer to the criticism that it
is irreconcilable with the principle of freedom of choice, so
basic to individual rights in a democracy, for the government
to say to supposedly free workers in America, either work in
the mines for eighty days under court order or go to jail for
contempt. They are becoming fearful, too, that if it is proper
by law to force workers to exercise that choice for eighty days,
nothing would prevent a wave of congressional hysteria from
making it 160 days or twice that figure. Thus we find a wave
of reflection sweeping public opinion these days. That innate
sense of American fair play plus our ingrained love for in-
dividual liberty is causing increasing numbers of Americans
to see the unfairness, injustice, and transgression on individual
freedom in any law which in part forces men to work for
private employers for eighty days or go to jail. This resent-
ment is likely to injure the prestige of our courts just as
government by injunction before the Norris-LaGuardia law
kept our courts under political attack. This principle of free-
dom from economic dictates by our courts, this right not to be
directed to work for another man for his profit for any period
of time, this struggle against the Hamiltonian theory of mak-
ing the courts the strong arm of capital is nothing new in
American industrial history. The Taft-Hartley law only pre-
sents it in a little different form. I have no doubt that, to the
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extent that the administration and enforcement of the Taft-
Hartlev law jeopardizes individual rights so that they cannot
be enjoyed in their full measure by free men, the law will in
due course of time be changed by the Congress. In the mean-
time, I have confidence that the courts of the land, with final
appeal to the Supreme Court, will eliminate from the law those
sections which I believe will and should be found to be un-
constitutional. However, the sections which place within the
jurisdiction of common law courts the power to settle labor
disputes by injunction in my opinion are not unconstitutional.
Rather, they are administratively unsound and in the long run
unworkable.
I have discussed the Taft-Hartley law in this lecture for the
primarv purpose of laying the foundation for a point of
political ethics which I wish to discuss as my final answer to
the question, "What do the American people want from their
politicians ?" I think you will agree with me that public opinion
in this country last year thought it wanted the Taft-Hartley
bill made law. I think you will agree further that most people
who wired their Congressmen and Senators to vote for the
Taft-Hartley law had never read the law and were not
familiar with its details. Neither were they familiar with its
administrative weaknesses or its probably unconstitutional
sections. Nevertheless, the pressure campaign was on, and
thousands upon thousands of citizens wired Congress to pass
the bill. All the public opinion polls showed large majorities in
favor of passage of the law. My party made a vote for the
law a test of party regularity.
I voted against the Taft-Hartley law. I voted to sustain
the President's veto. Query: Did I violate the ethical obliga-
tion of a member of the Senate to carry out the will of the
people in accordance with the intent of our representative
form of government?
I think not, but before I tell you why, I want to cite
another example which illustrates this ethical problem. Last
year I was one of two Republicans who voted against the
Knutson tax reduction bill. That bill was considered as another
acid test of party regularity. However, there was no clear
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evidence that the American people wanted that bill passed.
This year I would have voted against the Knutson House tax
reduction bill, but I voted for the Millikin Senate tax reduc-
tion bill. I think the American people wanted that bill passed.
This year I would still vote against the Taft-Hartley bill if it
were before us for original passage. Is there a thread of sound
consistency in my voting record on these bills compatible with
the ethical duty of a Senator to put into law the will of the
people? I think so, and I offer my discussion of that question
of political ethics as my answer to the one question which col-
lege students put to me most frequently, namely, "When do
you think you are justified in voting your convictions as
against what appears to be public opinion?" I am convinced
that my approach to that question, insofar as carrying out the
mandate of representative government is concerned, is in ac-
cordance with what the people want from their politicians.
With apology for illustrating the point with personal ref-
erences, I shall use my votes on the Taft-Hartley bill and on
tax bills during the past two years as the basis for my discus-
sion of this ever-interesting question of political ethics. I
discussed it at some length in the Senate on March 22 of this
year when I announced my reasons for supporting the 1948
Millikin tax reduction bill after having been one of the leaders
in the fight against the 1947 Knutson tax reduction bill. In
the course of that speech I pointed out that I had not changed
my views on taxes and that I still stand in support of every-
thing I said on taxes in my 1947 major speech under the title
"A Progressive Republican Tax Program." I pointed out that
such being true it was quite proper that the question should
be asked me, "In view of your opposition to the Knutson tax
bill of 1947, what is your explanation or your rationalization
or your excuse for voting for the 1948 Millikin bill? I had
what I consider to be a series of very good reasons for voting
for this tax bill, but reasons which nevertheless should be
accompanied with certain very definite warnings to the Ameri-
can people concerning the fiscal policies of the Federal govern-
ment as represented by the policies expressed in the Millikin
tax bill.
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In listing my reasons for voting for the 1948 tax bill in
contrast to voting against the 1947 tax bill, I want to make
the following points
:
First, I endeavor in my position in the Senate to carry out
to the best of my abilities what I consider to be the basic
theories of representative government as contemplated by the
Founding Fathers of the Constitution. I would point out to the
American people that there is constantly confronting one in
the position of a United States Senator the ethical problem of
adjusting his honest convictions on the merits of issues to his
duty always to carry out what he concludes to be the crystal-
lized dominant majority opinion of the people at any time on a
given legislative subject. That produces a great conflict of
conscience sometimes, because it is so easy for one in my posi-
tion to assume that the majority opinion at a given time on a
given issue coincides with his personal convictions on that
issue when sometimes that is not the case. But once he becomes
convinced that his personal convictions on a given issue are
out of line with the dominant crystallized opinion of the
country, then I say, under our representative form of govern-
ment, he has the duty to bow to that opinion, because the
people through him have the right to have a fixed, crystallized
public opinion put into law. I do not mean that it becomes a
Senator's duty to vote for just any law, because there are some
other ethical considerations relating to one's duty in the
Senate that he must take into account before he votes on any
given piece of legislation. Once he is convinced that the people
want legislation on a certain subject, even though his personal
convictions lead him to believe that it is unwise at the time to
pass that type of legislation, I say it is clearly his duty as a
representative of the people to do what he can to bring about
legislation that is sound and that will carry out the dominant
will of the country.
Relating that proposition to the 1948 tax legislation,
although I have personal fears of drastic tax reduction at this
time, I am perfectly convinced that the American people today,
by an overwhelming majority of sentiment, are saying to the
Members of the Congress, "We want and we expect you to
pass tax-reduction legislation."
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I think it would be a false assumption that the American
people are saying to the Congress, "We are asking that you
pass the 1948 Millikin bill," because, let us be frank about it,
the great majority of the American people are not familiar
with the details of the bill. If we are going to be intellectually
honest about the proposition to which I am addressing myself,
we must admit that relatively few people in the United States
are, to any considerable degree whatsoever, familiar with the
details of any bill pending before the Senate. So there does
rest on us as individual Members of the Congress the ethical
duty of ascertaining for ourselves whether or not a given piece
of legislation, in this instance the Millikin tax bill, will
carry out what I am satisfied is the clear mandate of a
majority of the American people who are asking for tax-
reduction legislation.
So in balancing these ethical duties which confront us in
carrying out the solemn trust which is ours, imposed upon us
by the people through a representative government, we must
ask ourselves in this instance whether this particular piece of
legislation is sufficiently reasonable, sufficiently sound, and
sufficiently proper from the standpoint of the public interest
to accomplish with reasonable effectiveness and a minimum of
damage to the public welfare what has become the crystallized
majority public opinion of the people on tax legislation.
To that question I found that in all intellectual honesty
I could answer in the affirmative, and I could make that
answer because of the great differences not only between the
Millikin bill and the Knutson tax bill of the last session of
Congress' but also between the bill as modified, as amended
by the Millikin Committee, and the Knutson bill which passed
the House of Representatives in the present session of
Congress.
At the risk of boredom I want to repeat from a little
different angle this ethical problem which confronted me as a
representative of the people of my State on this tax legisla-
tion, namely, that they have the right to expect me to do what
I can to bring about the best tax-reduction bill that can be
enacted at the present session of Congress without at the same
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time passing a tax bill which is so detrimental to the public
interest that I, in good conscience, would have to say, "It is
better, it is much better, that I vote against this bill and tell
my people why I am against the bill, than to vote for a bill
which I think is so unsound from the standpoint of the public
welfare that it would not be a proper way of carrying out a
public mandate requesting a tax-reduction bill."
After literally many hours of study of the bill, and after
wrestling with some very deep convictions on serious questions
of taxation confronting the people, I found myself in a posi-
tion where in all honesty I was free to tell the people of my
State and the people of my country that I believed a vote for
this tax bill was the proper vote to cast on the merits of the
bill. Hence I voted for it. But I voted for it only after putting
in the Record some very serious warnings concerning our
fiscal policy which I believe need to be issued to the American
people at this time.
There is another angle to the ethical considerations I have
raised. One has only to sit as a Member of the Senate to un-
derstand and appreciate the problems of ethics that confront
him in seeking to carry out the principles of a representative
government and at the same time maintain in the Senate com-
plete intellectual honesty as an individual citizen.
I state this angle of political ethics in this way: I could
never see my way clear, no matter how strong I felt public
opinion was on a given issue, to vote for a piece of legislation
which I believed to be either unconstitutional or which I was
convinced would not in fact, because of its provisions, carry
out the intent of the American people as expressed by a man-
date in a given demand for legislation on a particular subject.
I can say to you that this point is very difficult to get across
to the American people ; I suspect perhaps it is politically un-
wise even to try to explain it to the American people because it
is so easy for opponents to misrepresent it and take it out of
context to one's political detriment. Nevertheless, I think it is a
point which must be driven home to our people, because 1
know of many in my State, as well as elsewhere in the
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country, who do not fully understand this very fundamental
principle of representation in the Congress of the United
States. They seem to be laboring under the illusion that we
are a pure democracy in the sense that our only duty in the
Congress of the United States is unqualifiedly to support
every public prejudice, every temporary opinion on the part of
the American people, and immediately put into effect such
views on the theory that they represent true majority opinion.
I call that making a Gallup-poll approach to our job in the
Senate, and I would have the American people ponder the fact
that representative government will never be safe in America
if we continue to increase the tendency on the part of both the
people and the Congress to do the job of legislating from the
standpoint of a Gallup-poll approach. It is a serious trend in
America, and when my mail says, "Can you not read the
Gallup poll?" my answer is "Yes, I can read the Gallup poll on
various issues, but I also know that the Gallup poll seldom
expresses fixed, crystallized public opinion on any issue." I am
not ready to turn the job of legislative statesmanship over to
the Gallup poll or to any similar device for determining
public opinion. I grant that such polls are very helpful in
determining what public attitudes are on certain legislative
issues, but Senators make a mistake if they think such polls
reflect any careful and thorough analyses of a given piece of
legislation by the public. The job of analyzing legislation rests
on us, and the people have the right to expect us to check leg-
islation for weaknesses and abuses as well as for unconstitu-
tional provisions. More than half the time— yes, I think more
than three-quarters of the time— such polls as the Gallup poll
merely reflect public attitudes including public prejudices. No
matter how impolitic it may be, I once again say that I am
never going to make a Gallup-poll approach to my job in the
United States Senate. If my remaining in the Senate is
dependent on making that type of approach, I shall take my
licking in 1950, firm in the conviction that I shall have made
a record in support of a very sound principle of representative
government, a principle to which the people themselves even-
tually will agree once they thoroughly understand it. It is
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permanent public opinion, it is crystallized public opinion, it
is public opinion based upon a careful analysis of the facts
involved in a given piece of legislation which it is my duty to
represent in the United States Senate, and no other type of
public opinion.
On June 5 of last year I discussed, in somewhat different
language, the same ethical problem which confronts a Member
of the United States Senate in carrying out crystallized, fixed,
permanent public opinion on a given issue. It caused a great
deal of consternation in some circles in my State when I
announced in the course of that speech that I would vote
against the Taft-Hartley bill.
I said that I would have to vote against the Taft-Hartley
bill on the basis of my study of it, even though public opinion
in my State— and in the Nation— showed by the polls that
the people seemed to think that they wanted the bill passed. It
was my explanation of my position on the Taft-Hartley bill
which was so completely overlooked by the press and which did
me such a grave political injustice. I pointed out as clearly as
I can use the English language that I could not vote for the
Taft-Hartley bill because I was satisfied that it would not fulfill
the desire of the American people for legislation which would
check labor abuses. I was convinced that the American people
did not understand the weaknesses of that bill. I was satisfied
that they were not familiar with its procedural shortcomings,
and were unaware of the fact that its great procedural weak-
nesses would defeat the very purposes which those groups in
America had in mind when they urged, by polls, telegrams, and
letters, the passage of such a measure.
I was confronted by the proposition of political ethics
which I am trying to explain and discuss in this lecture,
namely, how far a Member of the United States Senate, in the
exercise of intellectual honesty, can justify voting for a given
piece of legislation simply because there is a tremendous wave
of public pressure urging its passage when he is convinced
that there is very little public understanding of the weaknesses
and shortcomings and the serious defects of the legislation
itself.
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So I say today, as I said on June 5, 1947, that if I were
presented today with the identical problem which confronted
me then with relation to the Taft-Hartley bill, I should again
cast a negative vote. I should cast that negative vote for the
same two main reasons which I set forth in my speech on
June 5, 1947.
First, because I think the American people are entitled to
receive from me, as a student of labor problems, a vote based
upon my knowledge of labor legislation and upon my honest
conclusion, after studying the Taft-Hartley bill, that it in-
volved certain unacceptable procedural weaknesses and in-
justices, including procedural violations of a basic principle of
American jurisprudence, namely, that there must be uniform
application of legal procedures to all people on whom the law
is to be applied if we are to retain equality of justice in
America. Because the Taft-Hartley law violates that basic
principle, and because the record which has been made under
the Taft-Hartley law since its enactment verifies the position
I took on June 5, I should have to say to the American people,
impolitic as the statement might be, that given the same choice
I had on June 5, 1947, I would cast the same "no" vote. I say
that because I could not, in intellectual honesty, vote for a bill
which, because of its violations of basic procedures of equality
of justice I deemed to be so detrimental to government by law
that a vote for it could not be justified. Under such circum-
stances I think it is my duty to vote "no" and then go before
my constituents and give my reasons for voting against such a
measure even though I may be satisfied at the time most of my
constituents think they want me to vote for such a given piece
of legislation because they are laboring under the mistaken
notion that it will accomplish the legislative objective which
they have in mind.
The second reason why, under like circumstances, I would
cast the same "no" vote today that I cast on the Taft-Hartley
bill last June is the reason I set forth in that June 5, 1947,
speech, namely, that I was convinced that the proposed law
contained unconstitutional provisions. I am still convinced of it.
There is an ethical consideration, an ethical duty resting
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upon each Member of the Congress of the United States which
rises high above effectuating a temporary public opinion in
support of a law which the public itself has never carefully
analyzed. That is the ethical duty of never violating the oath
of office which one takes when he undertakes the solemn ob-
ligation of serving his people in the United States Senate.
So, if at any time I am honestly and sincerely convinced
that a given proposal for a law is in fact unconstitutional, as
I was convinced the Taft-Hartley bill was unconstitutional, I
shall vote against the proposal, no matter how strong the
public demand for it may be.
Why do I say that? I say that because the people of my
State sent me to the Senate to sustain and support the Consti-
tution, and to live up to my oath to support it and sustain it.
Thus I think there is a mandate from the American people
which supersedes all other public demands and which is basic
in the American system of representative government, namely,
the mandate that we shall vote in the Senate of the United
States in accordance with our honest convictions as to the con-
stitutionality of any piece of legislation brought before us.
Whenever I cannot square such legislation with my convictions
as to its constitutionality, then I shall vote against it. I agree
that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of con-
stitutionality, but when careful analysis of a bill such as the
Taft-Hartley bill leaves one convinced that it contains un-
constitutional sections he should vote "no."
When I made my major speech against the Taft-Hartley
bill, I pointed out that I considered certain of its sections to be
unconstitutional; and although those sections have not yet
reached the United States Supreme Court, it is interesting to
note that already there is a growing recognition on the part
of employers and public groups generally that there are fea-
tures of the law which are unconstitutional. Being of that
opinion at the time I voted on the bill, it seems to me that if
I were to be true to my oath of office, I had no other course of
action to follow but to vote against the bill. It is interesting to
note that one section of the bill has been declared unconstitu-
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tional by a lower Federal court, and I believe the court's de-
cision will be sustained when the issue reaches the United
States Supreme Court. Those of us who opposed the Taft-
Hartley bill during the course of the Senate debate challenged
this section of the law along with others on constitutional
grounds.
So much for an explanation of my vote against the Taft-
Hartley bill even though public opinion polls showed strong
public support of the bill. Now what about the comparison of
that "no" vote with a "yes" vote on the 1948 tax bill, espe-
cially in view of my "no" vote against the 1947 tax bill. There
is nothing unconstitutional about the 1948 tax measure. In my
opinion, to a considerable degree it will carry out the mandate
of the American people for tax-reduction legislation. It is
workable legislation; of that I have satisfied myself. It is
legislation which is fair, provided certain very serious com-
plications do not develop in the world scene in the months
immediately ahead. But if those complications should develop,
then I say to the people of my State and to all of the American
people that it would become incumbent upon the Congress of
the United States to meet in extraordinary session, as I am
sure it would, and proceed to pass additional tax legislation
which would contain provision for the maintenance of a Fed-
eral revenue sufficiently high to protect our national security.
It is quite a different bill from the Knutson bill passed by
the House of Representatives. I cannot stress that point too
strongly in this statement of my reasons for my vote for the
1948 tax bill. I say that because if the only choice we had was
the bill which came to us from the House of Representatives,
then I think I would have had no course of action to follow
but to say to the American people, "I think the House bill is
so drastic and so detrimental to the fiscal stability of our Gov-
ernment that I feel compelled to vote against it, and then to tell
you why, on the assumption that if you, too, knew the reasons,
you would not want me to vote for it." One can call that the
political risk of representative government from the office-
holder's standpoint, but it is also a test of statesmanship as
to whether one is willing to run the gauntlet by voting against
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a piece of legislation if he honestly believes that the proposed
legislation, if enacted, would be detrimental to the welfare of
the people and if he honestly believes that if the people knew
of the weaknesses and the defects of the bill, they, too, would
want him to vote against it. In other words, determining what
is majority opinion also involves a consideration of the element
of timing, because the majority opinion that counts, the ma-
jority opinion that I think a representative should seek to
serve is the majority opinion which he believes would exist if
all the people had all the facts which he has when he comes to
vote on a given piece of legislation. I call it the political risk
of representation, and I studied this piece of tax legislation
from that standpoint.
I studied at great length the many representations which
had been made to me by constituents who have made a very
careful study of tax legislation. I studied the representations
which came to me from farm groups, from labor organiza-
tions, from chambers of commerce, from all groups that have
taken the time in the last few months to make a detailed and
careful analysis of various proposals for tax reduction. I came
to the honest conclusion— and one can say little more in
explanation of a vote— that, regardless of some of the short-
comings of this bill, I believed that if all the American people
took the time to study the bill in detail their mandate for tax
reduction would be the same; they still would say "Vote for
tax-reduction legislation." I think they would say that this
bill should be passed. I do not think that would be true if the
choice we had were only the House bill. I think public opinion
would be greatly different if today we were to offer to the
American people the House bill, and they took the time to
study it in detail, with no choice offered them to vote for the
Millikin bill. I would be perfectly willing to stand by the as-
sertion, and accept my political responsibility for it, that the
American people would agree that the bill passed by the House
was too drastic, went too far, and was not sufficiently safe for
the economy of this country to be passed at this time. In other
words, I am saying that I think under the able leadership of
the Senator from Colorado there has been brought forth a
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bill which would cause the American people, on the basis of
careful study, to say to me, "Yes, we think you ought to vote
for this bill."
There is a great deal of subjectivity in the problem which
confronts the individual Senator in determining for himself
what his political duty is in connection with his vote on any
given piece of legislation. I recognize that there is much sub-
jectivity in my mental processes which have caused me to
reach the conclusion that if all the details of the 1948 tax bill
were thoroughly understood by the American people, they
would tell me to vote for it. Likewise, there is much subjec-
tivity in my conclusion that if the only choice I gave them were
the Knutson bill in its House form, they would give me a
contrary mandate. Nevertheless, that is my honest opinion. One
cannot explain to anyone else's satisfaction, on the basis of
objective criteria, I admit, the subjective processes which
cause one to reach a certain conclusion. But I wish to repeat
that I voted for the 1948 tax bill because I think it does not
violate sound public policy at this time, whereas I think the
more drastic bill which the House of Representatives passed
would violate it, and would leave me in such a position that
I would have to run the political risk that I previously spoke
about, by voting against the House bill, and then telling my
constituents why I voted against it, in the firm conviction that
once they knew, they, too, would agree.
As to the merits of the 1948 tax bill, I wish to say that the
bill is much more than a mere modification of the percentages
of existing tax rates in that it seeks at least to make some
progress in the treatment of gross inequities in the tax struc-
ture. I find it a great improvement over the bill which the
Senator from Colorado offered to the Senate last year and
which I voted against. As I have said so many times, the real
problem of tax reduction in the United States is not basically
a problem of readjusting tax rates by way of percentage jug-
gling or modification; the real tax problem that confronts us
is the problem of tackling the gross inequities which exist in
our present tax structure, and which make it so difficult for
us to go forward with an expanding economy and to maintain
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government revenues at a level sufficiently high to meet our
domestic and international obligations. If we leave those in-
equities in the tax structure and merely give the American
people some downward cuts in tax-rate percentages, we shall
have given them no real tax reduction. I use the word "real"
in the sense and with the meaning that the word "real" is
used when we speak of "real wages." I say that if all we do
is to modify the percentages of tax rates, we shall have given
the American people no real tax reduction.
After the passage of time— and I do not think very much
time either— the so-called dollar savings realized from a tax
reduction resulting only in a downward reduction in percent-
ages will be eaten up by way of a further depreciation in the
value of the American dollar. I think it would have been one
of the worst types of public fraud to have passed the type of
tax bill which was offered last year, which for the most part
consisted only in a juggling of percentage rates. I said then,
and I repeat now, that a tax bill which does not seek to come
to grips with some of the gross inequities of the present tax
structure which are preventing an expanding economy from
going forward will further depreciate the value of the Amer-
ican dollar.
We cannot change economic laws. If the inflationary spiral
is permitted to proceed upward and the value of the American
dollar to proceed downward, the final result, of course, is going
to be an economic collapse ; how soon, not being a prophet, I
cannot tell, but I point out that such a danger is a very real
and serious one.
So I am not interested, even in a presidential election year,
in offering the American people a tax bill which does nothing
but juggle percentages in the rates of taxation. But the Mil-
likin bill which we passed did much more than that; it goes
much further than merely making adjustments of percentages
in tax rates. It is a bill which shows definite progress in the
direction of at least starting to eliminate some of the gross
inequities in our tax structure. Therefore I was able to vote
for it and at the same time square my vote with my general
view that we must keep Federal revenues high if we are to
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solve our national financial problems. I think that the elimina-
tion of tax inequities are essential to increasing our tax rev-
enues through an expanding economy. There were many things
about the 1948 bill I did not like, but I felt that taken as a
whole it was better than the existing tax structure and met, in
a measure, the public demand for tax reduction. However, in
struggling with the ethical question, "Will my vote promote
the national welfare?" I was greatly concerned over the failure
of the bill to come to grips with the national debt problem.
Thus I said,
When I say we are headed for economic insolvency in this
country unless we proceed to revise our fiscal policies in such
manner so that we can go forward with an expanding economy
and meet our international and domestic obligations, I mean the
maintenance of a balanced budget over the years. I may add that
the danger will be greatly increased if we do not come to more
realistic grips with the national debt than we have done so far in
the Congress of the United States.
The Senator from Colorado, in an exchange with me in the
debate last year, pointed out that one of the tax principles on
which he stands is the principle that in times of great prosperity
and high income we should tax high and pay our debts, so that
in periods of business recession and depression we can lower
taxes and decrease our payments on the debt. At that time I said
in the debate that he and I were in complete agreement as to what
is the most important underlying principle which ought to govern
tax legislation, and I repeat that today. But I want the Record
to show that although I am going along with this tax bill, Mr.
President, I think it is a grievous mistake, even in a presidential
election year, for the Congress of the United States to adopt a
budgetary policy which does not include at least a minimum pay-
ment of $5,000,000,000 on the national debt.
I am willing to venture the suggestion now, Mr. President,
that the American people, in the not too distant future, will come
to recognize that statement of mine as being essentially sound.
Every businessman knows that he cannot justify a fiscal policy
for his business which does not provide for an annual retirement
of his debt in an amount at least equal to the carrying charges on
the debt. I should like to hear from any businessman in America
who denies that premise, who will deny that at a time of high
income in his business, of high profits, of high prosperity, he
should proceed to retire the debt on his business by an amount
at least equal to the carrying charges on his debt. Of course most
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businessmen will tell us that it is sound debt retirement practice
to pay much more than that. If it is good practice in an individual
business in times of high prosperity to pay more than the carry-
ing charges on a business debt, then it is a good rule to apply to
the public debt. The American people, not the Government of the
United States, owe a debt which is, in round figures, approxi-
mately $260,000,000,000. It is a public debt. It is the debt of all
the people of the country. The carrying charges on that debt are
in excess of $5,000,000,000. I understand that they amount to
$5,250,000,000.
I say, Mr. President, we ought to practice good business policy
in Government, also, and as politicians, we ought to have the
courage and the vision to tell the American people that they
should tighten their belts and pay annually at least $5,000,000,000
on the national debt. With the international situation what it is,
with the potential dangers in that situation, with the potential
future expenditures that may be imposed upon us in case things
shall not go so well internationally, the debt will become greater
rather than smaller. So, Mr. President, I register again this year,
as I did last year, my dissent from the proposition that we should
pay only $2,500,000,000 on the national debt. That is only half
enough as a minimum.
Mr. President, my faith in the sound judgment of the Amer-
ican people is such that I still believe that if we made the economic
facts known to the people, if they understood the relationship of
the public debt to their own individual prosperity, if they under-
stood the relationship of the debt to maintaining a solvent Gov-
ernment, they would say, "If you can prove to us, if you can
satisfy us, that you have cut all unnecessary Government ex-
penditures to the bone, that you have economized without adopting
a penny-wise and pound- foolish policy, we are ready to say that
you as Senators and Congressmen should authorize the paying of
at least $5,000,000,000 on the debt."
I hope that my discussion of the reasons behind my votes
on the Taft-Hartley bill and the 1948 tax bill will illustrate
for you both the subjective and objective factors which pro-
duce votes in the Senate. I hope also that this discussion of
my wrestle with problems of political ethics will show you
students that there is a practical relationship between class-
room theories of representative government and representative
government in practice. I hope for something else, too, namely,
that you will ponder the question as to whether or not I am
right in my view or just indulging in wishful thinking when
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I say that I think what the American people want most of all
from their politicians is an exercise of an honest independence
of judgment on the merits of issues as established by the evi-
dence made available to them. If I am right about that, then
constitutional liberalism can move forward with the enlighten-
ment of the people. Even against odds, it has a fighting chance
of preserving representative government in America by ever
seeking to accomplish the full measure of its primary objective
of protecting the economic and political weak from the ex-
ploitation of the economic and political strong, but doing it
with the framework of a private property economy and in
accordance with the legal principles and guarantees of our
Constitution, including its precious bill of human rights.
I close by suggesting that unless we rededicate ourselves
to such a faith in government by free men and back up that
faith by maintaining free men in political office in this country,
representative self-government in America will continue to be
Aveakened and will not forever endure. In pondering our ethical
obligations to constitutional liberalism, from which stem our
rights as a free people, let us take strength and inspiration
from those lines of Louis Untermeyer which bespeak so well
his philosophy of political liberalism:
Ever insurgent let me be,
Make me more daring than devout;
From sleek contentment keep me free,
And fill me with a buoyant doubt.
Open my eyes to visions girt
With beauty, and with wonder lit —
"But let me always see the dirt,
And all that spawn and die in it.
Open my ears to music; let
Me thrill with Spring's first flutes and drums —
But never let me dare forget
The bitter ballads of the slums.
From compromise and things half-done
Keep me with stern and stubborn pride —
And, when, at last, the fight is won,
God keep me still unsatisfied.
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Joseph Pulitzer had a precautionary maxim which he quoted
to his editors: "When in doubt leave out." His purpose, of
course, was only to cause his editors to be sure of what they
were printing. Naturally he had no thought of restricting their
initiative. Joseph Pulitzer would have had no use for any
editor who was so slow in verifying news leads that he was
"leaving out" most of the time. I shall have to "leave out" a
good deal this evening of what I should like to say, if there
were time, on this occasion of my return to my University.
My first words must include my thanks and my apprecia-
tion. I am grateful for the generous invitation which brings
me here and for the spirit of the man in whose memory the
invitation was extended. For though it was never my good
fortune to meet Edmund Janes James, I came to know early
in my student days how much he had to do with the shaping
of the University of Illinois. He took up his duties on this
campus the year I was born. Before I turned up as a freshman
in 1923, he had retired. About midway through my under-
graduate years, word came of his death in California where
he had gone for his health. Well do I remember the grief
which came over this community with the arrival of that sad
news. Everyone realized that the University had lost a leader
who helped so much to make it a great demonstration of public
education at the university level.
A native of Jacksonville, that New England town in west-
1 Delivered May 12, 1949.
The author was captain, major, and lieutenant colonel in the United
States Army, 1943- 1946, and was decorated by the United States, Britain,
and France for his staff work at General Eisenhower's headquarters.
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ern Illinois, Edmund Janes James grew up in that generation
of post-Civil War scholars who studied under the academic
leaders of two continents. He was the son of a presiding elder
of the Illinois Methodist Conference. After graduating from
the high school of Illinois State Normal University in 1873,
he spent a year at Northwestern University. Then, after an-
other year of study at Harvard, he went to the University of
Halle in Germany where he studied economics under Conrad
and wrote his doctoral dissertation on the American tariff. In
Halle he met Anna Margarethe Lange, who became his wife
and the mother of his six children.
When Edmund James came to the University of Illinois
in 1904 he was already among the half dozen outstanding uni-
versity leaders of the country. He had taken an active part in
the organization of the American Economic Association. As
professor of public finance and administration in the new
Wharton School of Finance and Economy at the University
of Pennsylvania, he became a leader in the movement of
young economists to bring the static "classical" economics up
to the fast changing times. As Edmund James observed the
rise of the American city, the center of his interest shifted
from economics to political science, with special concern over
municipal problems. In 1891 he was the first president of the
Municipal League of Philadelphia. If this activity showed him
to be moving in the direction of his times, an even more im-
portant evidence— one which has lasted to this very hour—
was his founding of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science in 1889-90. He served as its president through
its formative decade, 1 890-1 901, and for the first six years was
editor of its Annals.
Virtually all this was before he reached his fortieth birth-
day. In his forty-first year he came back to his home state as
professor of public administration and director of the new field
of university extension at the University of Chicago. Five
years later he forsook intensive scholarship to become presi-
dent of Northwestern University. His performance at Evans-
ton was so notable that after only two years he was elected
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to the presidency of the University of Illinois. Here he spent
the fifteen years from 1904 to 19 19.
One of his distinguished colleagues here, the historian,
Evarts Boutell Greene, wrote of this service:
He was exceptionally equipped for his new post. A native of
the state, he knew its public school system at first-hand as pupil
and teacher, while his knowledge of educational developments at
home and abroad gave him an unusual perspective. Above all, he
believed in the ability and willingness of a democracy, properly
led, to build up a real university. His first appeal to the Legis-
lature brought the biennial appropriation to nearly a million and
a half, and during the next decade this amount was increased to
about five millions.
Meantime, though admission requirements were advanced,
student attendance increased more than eighty per cent; the
faculty was rapidly expanded; and several major buildings were
added. More significant was the enlargement of research equip-
ment and the setting of higher standards. To a remarkable extent
the younger workers— whether in humanistic, scientific or pro-
fessional studies — were made to feel that their special problems
were understood.
To these words of Professor Greene, I should like to add
an observation of my own as to what was perhaps his greatest
service of all. That was in the recruiting of young teachers
with promise for attainment in the future. Thus, early in
President James' tenure there came to the classrooms and
seminars of this university many of the teachers who were to
grow great with it. James W. Garner and John A. Fairlie in
political science, Laurence M. Larson in history, Ernest L.
Bogart in economics, Albert W. Noyes in chemistry, Stuart
Pratt Sherman and Jacob Zeitlin in literature— that list of
notable teachers could be long extended.
It is only fair to assume that those close relations and the
appreciation which President James showed for his staff still
characterize this university three decades after his retirement.
Indeed, it may be expected that the mutual regard of admin-
istrator and teacher is more widespread now than it was then.
Surelv the lesson which President James taught will never be
forgotten at his university.
It is fitting that the distinguished services of President
James to the University of Illinois should be commemorated
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by this series of lectures endowed by his daughter, Mrs. Helen
Frazer, and a review of the series would reveal a notable list
of lecturers on a wide range of subjects— five scholars who
have been presidents of the American Political Science Asso-
ciation, an Ambassador, a Judge of the World Court, a
Senator, and a United States Representative— specialists in
international law, civil administration, political theory and
practice, history, and public opinion. Although profoundly
aware that I am unworthy to be in such goodly company, I am
grateful for the opportunity to stand on this platform as an
alumnus and publicly acknowledge my obligation to Edmund
Janes James and to the University of Illinois.
My subject, dealing with an aspect of Military Govern-
ment in Germany is, at any rate, peculiarly fitting for this
occasion, in view of the fact that on this very day the blockade
of Berlin has been lifted and the splendid success of the air
bridge from the Western Zones to the beleaguered city has
been demonstrated; that just at this time the new Constitu-
tion for the Republic of Germany has been approved by the
delegates at Bonn and submitted to the German states for
ratification ; that everywhere people are talking about the cur-
rent meeting of the Big Four's Foreign Ministers in reference
to the future of the whole of Germany.
We may be sure that all these developments would have
been good news to Edmund Janes James. He knew and loved
the best in Germany and it was a blow to him when the worst
in that confused and puzzling land made war on this country
until Woodrow Wilson had no other course but to lead us to
battle against Prussian military lords in 191 7. When that un-
happy hour came President James put sentiment aside and led
his university and his state in the war effort. He would have
done so a second time had he been with us in the years of
Hitler's madness. And he would have welcomed the new
promise of saner days and a revival of those German traits he
had learned to know at Halle.
There are many factors underlying this better news from
Germany. As a newspaperman, I like to think that a con-
tributing cause of some little influence is the new free andl6
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democratic press which has been developed in the American
zone of occupation and in the American sector of Berlin. This
is the aspect of American Military Government in and after
World War II which I have selected for our discussion. It
combines my civilian work and a part of my military experi-
ence and it joins President James' interests in political science,
democracy, and the German people. I hope the theme will not
seem inappropriate in the James lecture series.
Definition of several terms is in order. We must distinguish
at the outset between Military Government, in the specific
sense, and Information Control. In the over-all, the entire
occupation became Military Government. But before this oc-
curred and while the occupation was in the hands of Army
commanders, Information Control operations were separate
from the Military Government detachments which took over
the administration of German cities and towns and states as
the military forces advanced.
Information Control, in whose jurisdiction the German
press fell, is not to be confused with military public relations.
Press Control was a section of Information Control. Press
Control, with its plans and responsibilities for the development
of a free German press, was an integral part of the large pro-
gram for the control of all information media. In addition to
newspapers, this included the radio, book publishing, and
magazine and periodical publishing of all sorts, even religious
journals. It included films, theater and music, and related
entertainment forms which Hitler also had bent to his special
ends in the most extensive use of mass propaganda media the
world has ever seen.
Information Control appeared to be an outgrowth of
Psychological Warfare. Actually Information Control was
planned to develop with and to succeed Psychological War-
fare, and that is exactly what happened. Military Public Rela-
tions, let us remember, was directed to the people back home.
Lieutenant Colonel Burrows Matthews, editor of the Buffalo
Courier-Express, was typical of its able personnel. Its mission
was to assist war correspondents and others of the press and
special visitors in seeing and reporting accurately the course
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of hostilities as promptly as was consistent with military
security. Psychological Warfare pointed in the opposite direc-
tion— away from the United States and toward the enemy,
toward the civilian as well as military elements of the enemy's
population.
Psychological Warfare is as old as the stratagem of the
wooden horse at Troy. In World War II it was developed to
a greater degree than ever before in history as an aid of
combat operations on the battlefield and in the air.
In pre-invasion weeks of General Eisenhower's famous
headquarters, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Ex-
peditionary Force), Psychological Warfare and Public Rela-
tions were co-equal sections of a new General Staff division.
This General Staff division was known for a short time as
G-6. It took its designation in numerical sequence after G-5
which was, as many of you know, the staff designation for
Military Government, or Civil Affairs, as Military Govern-
ment was called in the liberated areas, such as France and
Belgium and the Netherlands.
Prior to World War II, the General Staff divisions his-
torically had been G-i, personnel; G-2, intelligence; G-3, plans
and operations ; and G-4, supplies. World War II added G-5
and, for a time, G-6. But in working out staff plans, it was
decided that G-6, instead of being a single General Staff divi-
sion, should be divided into two Special Staff divisions. Thus,
there developed the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD)
and the Public Relations Division (PRD) at SHAEF. Each
was headed by a general officer responsible, through the Chief
of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to General
Eisenhower.
The Psychological Warfare Division had for its chief,
Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, incidentally, a native
of nearby Mattoon. To his work as the responsible head of
planning for Psychological Warfare and Information Con-
trol, General McClure brought, in addition to his extensive
training in Regular Army schools, including the Infantry,
Cavalry, and Command and General Staff schools, the experi-
ence of the African campaign. There, under General Eisen-
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hower, Psychological Warfare, Public Relations and Military
Government, were extensively tried and tested for much
greater use in the invasion of continental Europe the next year.
PWD gathered perhaps the most unusual array of spe-
cialist skills and talents in the employment of words and ideas
ever assembled in a staff of its size by the Army. This staff
included war correspondents, newspaper editors and writers;
book publishers and magazine editors ; radio commentators
and technicians
;
poll takers and opinion survey conductors
;
professional psychologists, sociologists, political scientists and
linguists. A much larger collection of specialists in utilities,
agriculture, transportation, law, economics, public safety,
health, education, civil administration and related fields was
assembled by Military Government. This much larger per-
sonnel of Military Government was trained in a series of Civil
Affairs Training Schools (CATS), set up at leading American
universities. The School of Military Government (SMG),
for the training of staff officers in Military Government as-
signments, as distinguished from personnel for the city and
town detachments, was established even earlier at the Uni-
versity of Virginia. After basic training at Fort Custer, I was
assigned to SMG at Charlottesville in 1943.
But back to Psychological Warfare Division. PWD per-
sonnel included, for example, Colonel John T. Whitaker, who
entered the Army from the foreign news service of the
Chicago Daily News. He was representative of those news-
paper writers who were not content to report the course of
the war but desired to have an active part in its prosecution.
William S. Paley, head of the Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, was chief of the radio section. Douglas Waples, pro-
fessor of research in reading in the University of Chicago
Library Service School, headed the book and magazine pub-
lications section. The Film, Theater and Music Section
gathered similarly qualified experts.
In terms of organization, perhaps the most interesting
aspect of the Psychological Division was the way that it joined
related wartime agencies of government in the United States
with their counterparts in England. Thus, civilian deputies to
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General McClure included representatives of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information
(OWI), respectively, Frederick Oechsner, former Berlin cor-
respondent of the United Press, and Charles Douglas Jackson,
managing director of Time-Life International, who had served
as deputy chief of the OWI overseas in North Africa and
the Middle East. On equal terms with them as deputies were
representatives of the British Ministry of Information (MOI)
and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), akin respec-
tively to the American OWI and OSS. These British agencies
sent to PWD, SHAEF, such able British scholars and pub-
licists as Dennis Routh and Richard H. S. Crossmann, the
latter now a member of the House of Commons. A staff meet-
ing under General McClure, with his deputies and his section
chiefs, was a rare assembly of civilian talents and skills. At
the same time it was a military organization with American
and British Colonels as military deputies. These included
Colonel Victor Roche, British, and Colonel Charles C. Blak-
eney and Colonel Harold D. Kehm, American. My recollection
is that on one occasion it was reliably said that a larger pro-
portion of PWD personnel knew the date of the Overlord
Operation for the invasion of Normandy than in any other
special staff division of SHAEF.
PWD prepared and distributed leaflets and small news-
papers for the enemy. At first these were showered out of
planes. Soon a special bomb was developed so that leaflets and
four-language newspapers were dropped on specific targets. At
the front such publications were fired in special shells from
our side. Some invited the enemy to surrender. Some described
the course of the war on the two European fronts and in the
Pacific. Some told the enemy's soldiers at the front about the
results of Allied bombing raids on their home communities
and about the internal conditions of their own country. Some
stated the war aims and ideals of the Allies. Some sought to
spare the civilians of the countries to be liberated by giving
them advance warning of bomb attacks on ports, supply
centers and other key enemy installations. All the while
PWD played a major role in getting the spoken word to the
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enemy bv the radio. Special appeals were directed to the mil-
lions of "displaced persons" who had been moved about
Europe by the Nazis as if they were not human beings at all
but so much livestock. Before the invasion, the radio appeals
came via the BBC in London. Later, radio stations on the
continent were used, including the important broadcasting
station in Luxembourg, where Colonel Clifford R. Powell,
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel R. Rosenbaum, William Harlan
Hale, Noel Newsome, and others did notable work.
Throughout the combat period, PWD mobile units were
active with the advancing armies. These units contained print-
ing equipment and personnel for the preparation and dis-
tribution of leaflets and surrender passes, depending on
conditions at a given time. Mobile loud-speakers were moved
about for direct appeals by German-speaking Allied personnel
to the enemv troops from one front line to the other. Lieu-
tenant Colonel J. L. Lazonby, Major Perry Miller and Eric
Hatch were representative of PWD personnel in the field.
I have gone into this detail about Psychological Warfare
to make clear the kind of combat duty in PWD which went
hand in hand with planning for the control of German infor-
mation media once the Allied armies were in Germany. A
second reason for presenting this detail is to show the im-
portance of the relationship between "promise" and "perform-
ance." For, Psychological Warfare was promise and Military
Government and Information Control were the performance
which was to come. It was requisite that PWD and MG be
kept in close liaison so that one would not promise more than
the other could hope to fulfill. It was also urgent that only
the truth be employed since the enemy had ways of testing the
veracity of what it heard on the radio and read in the under-
ground and clandestine publications. The truth paid large
dividends.
Within the Plans and Directives Section of PWD, a special
German Planning Subsection worked on plans for the control
of the German press, radio and other information media. The
staff of this section included British and American officers and
one Canadian, the latter being Lieutenant Colonel Allen
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Chambers, a member of the House of Parliament at Ottawa
from Vancouver Island. Representative of the American mili-
tary personnel in this section were Lieutenant Colonel John
S. Minary, Lieutenant W. Phillips Davison, a sociologist, now
editor of Public Opinion Quarterly, published at Princeton
University. From the British forces came Lieutenant Colonel
Arthur N. Galsworthy, on leave from the staff of the British
Colonial Office. These and others who worked with them from
time to time drew on a widespread experience with German
history, customs, attitudes and organization.
So it was that the division of SHAEF which was respon-
sible for the use of the Allied radio in combat became respon-
sible for the seizure, protection and operation of the enemy's
radio. The personnel which employed the printed word in
many ways to help defeat the Nazis was charged with the
mission of planning and developing a free and democratic
press in the enemy's country with the cessation of hostilities.
The first goal was a complete break with the order created
by Hitler. This was achieved through Military Government
Law No. 191, which was drafted by PWD's Plans and Direc-
tives Section in collaboration with the Legal Section of G-5.
The phraseology and translation of this law were worked out
with a great deal of care. I have brought a printed copy of
this law and its parallel German translation so you may see
how it first appeared on walls and bulletin boards.
This law, which was posted along with other Military
Government laws and orders as the troops entered Germany,
suspended the German press, radio, book and magazine pub-
lishing industries and all public forms of theatrical or musical
entertainment. It also prohibited all activities of Hitler's
Propaganda Ministry and its many subsidiaries. The opening
words of Law No. 191 stated that its provisions were drawn
and promulgated "for the purpose of insuring the security of
the Allied Expeditionary Force in Germany and the achieve-
ment of the objectives of the Supreme Commander."
It was anticipated that non-Nazi newspapers, under po-
litically clean editors and publishers, could not be established
immediately or even in a fairly short time. To fill the void
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between the blackout imposed by Law No. 191 and the de-
velopment of an acceptable indigenous press, Psychological
Warfare Division planned and conducted a Publishing Opera-
tions Section. Personnel of this section stayed up close to
combat and, as fast as suitable target cities were captured, set
up frankly American newspapers in the German language.
These publications, which were produced by a staff of
German-speaking and writing personnel under Captain Hans
Habe, reached approximately a score in number in the Ameri-
can zone of occupation. Designed as stopgaps to assist the
Military Commanders in the areas of their responsibility, these
newspapers were intended to publish only until acceptable
licensees could be found, thoroughly investigated and formally
approved by the Army.
This same procedure was followed by PWD, and its suc-
cessor, Information Control Division (ICD), in planning for
and developing Nazi-free magazines, books, radio, films,
theater and music. Drafts of directives covering each field
were worked out by PWD, after which they were discussed
and cleared with all General Staff sections of SHAEF, in-
cluding, in the later stages, the British and American political
advisers, respectively, Charles Peake and Robert Murphy.
Finally, these directives were expanded and supplemented with
guidance material and other information about Germany and
issued under the authority of the Chief of Staff, as the
"Manual for the Control of German Information Services."
This handbook, which was printed at the Imprimerie
Nationale in Paris, was distributed at all levels and became the
guide of Information Control officers in the field. The British
adapted it for use in their zone and it was translated into
French for use in the zone assigned for occupation to France.
General McClure directed the work of ICD just as he
directed PWD. His several headquarters were in succession
London (also Kingston) ; Paris (also Versailles and Reims) ;
Frankfurt, Bad Homburg and Berlin. I hope I have been able
thus far to convey the idea that duty in this division was
exceedingly interesting and that its responsibilities were both
serious and important.
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Let me repeat that the operations of PWD and ICD were
separate from the widely ranging activities of Military Gov-
ernment. Actually, once our forces were in Germany all were
engaged in the occupation and hence all were a part of Mili-
tary Government. But it came as a surprise to many and
something of a disappointment that the development of a free
press, for example, was not a duty of the MG officer in a
German city.
In the planning stages at PWD, I was assigned to the
Plans and Directives Section. In addition, I was the liaison
officer between PWD and G-5 and other General Staff sec-
tions at SHAEF. I did all one Captain could do to keep the
two rapidly growing divisions and their many sections and
subsections aware of each other and how their missions were
related. All the while, General McClure was in touch with the
Generals assigned to G-5, including Brigadier General Frank
J. McSherry and Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes. I can
say of my own knowledge that Psychological Warfare and
Information Control plans and policies were co-ordinated with
G-5 step by step. I attended staff meetings of both divisions
and saw to it that no PWD or ICD policies of interest to G-5
were sent to the Chief of Staff without prior consultation and
concurrence at G-5.
Notwithstanding this close and continuous liaison, there
are those who think that the connection was not intimate
enough. One of those who thinks that Information Control
planning and operation should have been under Military Gov-
ernment from the beginning is Harold Zink, then professor of
political science at DePauw University (later at Ohio State
University), known personally to many of the faculty mem-
bers here tonight. Dr. Zink has written what undoubtedly is
the most thoroughly descriptive book on G-5 in the occupation
zone vet produced, American Military Government in Germany
(The Macmillan Company, 1947). It is because I admire this
book so much on the whole that I must differ with its con-
clusions about Information Control and Military Government.
I knew Dr. Zink when he was a hard-working Major in the
United States Group Control Council at Bushy Park or Wide-
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wing, previously General Eisenhower's headquarters, at King-
ston, south of London. By that time PWD had moved to the
continent and lines were kept up with London by liaison
officers and couriers. My immediate superior, Lieutenant
Colonel Minary, and I both made trips back to the U.S. Group
C.C., which was charged with the over-all planning for the
administration of Germany on a long-term basis. Major Zink's
responsibility was to assemble plans from each section of the
Control Council in order to correlate them and issue them in
advance of the assumption of responsibility in the field.
Recalling the period which I have just described and
remembering the field experience, Harold Zink writes in his
book:
For a considerable period no attention was given to the press,
the radio and the cultural sphere by Military Government. In the
U.S. Group C.C. for Germany the early organization charts indi-
cated that some responsibility for this field belonged to the
Political Division, but subsequent discussions revealed much am-
biguity in the minds of the Chief of Staff and Office of Com-
manding General as to how far this went. However, the Political
Division began to draft plans for the control of the Reich Min-
istry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda under which the
Nazis had literally dominated not only the press and radio but
virtually all German cultural life.
As time passed it became apparent that there were strong
influences at work in the ETO aimed at keeping the main Military
Government organization out of this field. Psychological Warfare
had built up one of those spectacular organizations which more or
less enjoyed autonomous authority. Though designed to assist in
bringing about the defeat of the Germans, it did not view its
mission as ending with the surrender of the Reich. Its Command-
ing General had ambitions to play a prominent role in Germany
after V-E day; many of its officers also were eager to carry on
their activities in a defeated Germany. Of course much of its
program had little or no bearing on the occupations of Germany
and it was not intended to move all of its personnel into the Reich,
but its Commanding General who had considerable influence in
regular Army circles exerted himself vigorously to carry over as
much of his organization as possible into Germany.
Despite the fact that the time was well advanced and Psycho-
logical Warfare personnel had had no Military Government experi-
ence and training and indeed existed as a distinct unit apart from
Military Government, the pressure brought to bear by this Gen-
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eral was sufficient to check the inclusion of control of the press,
the radio, the movies and the theater in the regular Military
Government setup. In order to make a proper impression an
Office of Information Services (Information Control) was or-
ganized to be immediately under the Office of Commanding
General in the U.S. Group C.C. for Germany. This office was to
be directed by the General who headed Psychological Warfare
and it was expected that he would bring over much of the per-
sonnel of Psychological Warfare with him.
But Psychological Warfare was in the very midst of its hos-
tility efforts at this time. Its officers were calling on the German
field troops by loud speaker to lay down their arms and surrender
to the Americans. It was beaming radio programs into Germany
aimed at breaking down civilian morale. It prepared numerous
pamphlets and broadsides which it scattered over Germany. Hence
it was in no position to participate in the work of the U.S. Group
C.C. for Germany in more than a nominal fashion. Its Command-
ing General occasionally visited the headquarters of the U.S.
Group C.C. for Germany to attend meetings and it supposedly
maintained a small staff there to prepare plans and be available
for consultation. But this staff actually spent most of its time far
away in the Psychological Warfare offices on the continent while
the U.S. Group C.C. for Germany was in England. When the
latter moved to Versailles, Psychological Warfare people had
offices in Paris, but they tended to be absent in Luxembourg and
various other places nearer the front much of the time.
The Office of Information Services (Information Control)
contributed its paper plans after more or less prodding, but it
never became an integral part of the U.S. Group C.C. for
Germany during the planning period. Its plans were drafted with-
out much reference to the general plans for the occupation of
Germany; its officers, though frequently able, never became a
vital part of the body of the U.S. Group C.C. for Germany. Thus
despite any intentions on their part they remained a separate
group cut off from the main body of Military Government and
not even well informed as to the psychology and program of
Military Government. The autonomous position of Psychological
Warfare during the tactical period may have had little signifi-
cance, but the corresponding status of its reincarnation, the Office
of Information Services (Information Control), in Military Gov-
ernment was unfortunate.
Let me make it clear, I am still quoting Dr. Zink. He
continues
:
Whether one regards the press, the radio, movies, the theater
and other cultural activities as part of education or not, it can
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hardly be denied that they are very intimately related to the
general program of Military Government. To cut them off from
the main body of Military Government in Germany was hardly
less serious than divorcing economic or financial matters or the
German courts from Military Government. A field that should
have been tied up in the most intimate fashion with the other
fields in Military Government and administered as an integral
part of Military Government from the planning level on down
through the operating detachments was permitted to exist apart.
The most effective liaison could never have made up for such
separation, but even the liaison was not too close.
Psychological Warfare could argue of course that it had cer-
tain experience and equipment that gave it a claim on this field
in occupied Germany. But the same arguments could have been
advanced by other Army units in other fields such as communi-
cations, transportation, and public health. And it is only fair to
say that they were to some extent in certain cases, with the result
that Military Government at times found itself in conflict with
the Signal Corps, the Transportation Corps, G-4, Military Police
and the Medical Corps. But in all of these other cases Military
Government insisted on maintaining its own subdivisions in these
fields and staffed them with its own personnel to the extent that
they were actually an integral part of Military Government.
Psychological Warfare was able to maintain its own identity and
to operate in a more or less autonomous relationship to Military
Government despite the paper transformation into an Office of
Information Services (Information Control).
Here I end the quotation from Dr. Zink. I have quoted
him at this considerable length so you will have the benefit of
his views as he himself states them. He says that "the work
performed by Psychological Warfare-Public Information
Services-Information Control was often well done," but it is
plain that he takes a generally dim view of the planning, the
administration and the performance.
In the light of my experience, just as Dr. Zink is guided
by his, I find it necessary to debate some of his points of fact
and certainly to question his conclusion. I have already de-
scribed the liaison maintained. In addition to the frequent
liaison missions performed by Lieutenant Colonel Minary and
myself, there were the daily trips— at one period— of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Raymond K. Fried from PWD in Paris to
LT.S. Group C.C. in Versailles. At other times, Lieutenant
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Colonel Charles A. H. Thomson, now on the staff of the
Brookings Institution, was active in this liaison for PWD.
General McClure made a practice of sending one of his officers
to U.S. Group C.C. meetings at Versailles when he himself
could not attend. One such meeting which I attended as
General McClure's representative was the morning of the day
on which Lucius D. Clay first wore his third star as a Lieu-
tenant General.
As Dr. Zink says, General McClure was chief of the In-
formation Services (Information Control) branch of the U.S.
Group C.C. for Germany at the same time he was chief of
PWD. Certainly General McClure and his staff in one capacity
knew what they were doing in the other. If the responsibility
was theirs, then there was no case of unfixed or even ill-
defined responsibility for the control of German information
media.
The test, however, is not so much the relative positions of
boxes in an organization chart, but how it works out in prac-
tice. Here I may speak not only as one who took part in the
PWD and ICD planning and liaison with G-5 and other
General Staff divisions. I may speak also as one who found
it his duty to go into the field and apply the policies and di-
rectives worked out at the planning level. On the basis of the
latter experience, I do not hesitate to say that the organiza-
tional separation between Information Control and Military
Government produced a major benefit which far outweighed
anv disadvantages. Let me make clear just what I mean.
The pressure on Military Government detachments in the
field always was to "get things going." This was true with
respect to transportation, electric and water utilities, fire and
police systems and municipal services generally. Inevitably in
an organization so large and far-flung as Military Government
there was an element of competition among detachments in
the restoration of the appearance, at least, of normal life
among the German communities. Under this pressure, Military
Government frequently and understandably put former Nazis
on the job.
Now I would be the last to criticize the Military Govern-
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ment detachment commander who put a Nazi to work clean-
ing up bomb damage. There was every reason to get some
hard work out of those who were so largely responsible for
the war and its horrors. Moreover, if a Nazi was put, for
example, in a supervisory utility post at the outset, he could
be supplanted by a man with a clean political record as soon
as the latter was found. These changes did not produce
serious political consequences when they were restricted to
such enterprises as street railways, water supply, public safety
and related municipal services.
But the installation of a Nazi as editor of a new newspaper
licensed by the American Army would have been another
matter altogether. The Germans watched particularly to see
what kind of choices we would make for editors and pub-
lishers. I assure you that the selection of any man known
among his fellows as even a Nazi sympathizer, though he had
never joined the party, would have been a serious mistake.
I do not mean to suggest at all that the Military Govern-
ment Officer would have licensed, by preference, politically
unacceptable Germans as editors and publishers. But the pres-
sure on the Military Government detachments would have been
very hard to resist. Indeed, this pressure was felt by Infor-
mation Control officers through their contacts with Military
Government. Yet by being apart from Military Government
and answerable to the American commander through another
chain of command, Information Control officers were, in my
opinion, free to do a more careful and a better job in a field,
related to be sure, but still of a different and more difficult
sort than those municipal service fields which were the respon-
sibility of Military Government.
As planned in PWD, there were two Information Control
areas in the American zone of occupation. The 6870 District
Information Services Control Command (DISCO was estab-
lished in Bavaria to have responsibility for the area under
supervision of General George S. Patton's Third United States
Army. Its first headquarters was in Munich and it retained a
detachment in that important city after the headquarters staff
moved, in August, 1945, to Schloss Seeburg on the east shore
(53)
of Wiirmsee, known locally as Starnbergersee. In the area of
General Alexander M. Patch's Seventh United States Army
the 6871 DISCC was established to control information
services in Hesse and Wtirttemberg-Baden. The headquarters
of the latter DISCC wras in Schloss Hohenbuchau in the
Taunus Mountains west of Wiesbaden. The two DISCCs
were commanded by regular Army officers. Colonel Bernard
B. McMahon was assigned to command 6871 and the expec-
tation was that Colonel Harold D. Kehm of PWD would
command 6870. But Colonel Kehm became G-2 for General
William H. Simpson's Ninth United States Army with the
result that the first commander of 6870 in the field in Bavaria
was Lieutenant Colonel William H. Kinard. Colonel Mc-
Mahon was soon transferred from the command of 6871 to
6870. With this transfer Lieutenant Colonel John Stanley
became the commanding officer of 6871. Subsequently, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Kinard took charge of plans and directives in
the headquarters of General McClure's Information Control
Division at Bad Homburg.
All these officers possessed definite qualifications for their
assignments even though none was an expert himself in the
information media field. Colonel McMahon, for example, had
seen service in the Army of Occupation at Coblenz after
World War I. One of his duties in that previous occupation
was to supervise publication of the Amaroc News, the news-
paper issued for the information of American personnel on
occupation assignment. A graduate of DePauw University,
formerly on the staff of the American Embassy in London, he
was wounded in combat early in the Normandy campaign.
After hospitalization in England, in 1944, he was assigned to
command the first of the DISCCs to enter Germany in 1945.
It was fortunate for Colonel McMahon that he had learned
the German language well enough in his World War I occu-
pation duty to enable him to communicate his ideas to Germans
in their own tongue. This meant a great deal to the officer
charged with responsibility for the licensing of newspapers and
the control of other information media. While Colonel Mc-
Mahon obviously had no use whatever for Nazism, he did like
(54)
many representatives of the German people and got along very
well with them.
The commanders of the DISCCs had well-qualified infor-
mation media men on their staffs. For example, the Chief of
the Press Control Section of 6871, first under Lieutenant
Colonel Kinard and then under Colonel McMahon, was Arthur
F. Gerecke of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Mr. Gerecke was
a civilian employee of the OWI, who went into Germany with
PWD's Publishing Operations Section and helped bring out
American papers in the German language at Heidelberg and
Munich. His newspaper experience included both the news and
business sides and prior to his work on the advertising staff
of the Post-Dispatch, he was publisher of the St. Louis West-
liche Post, last German language newspaper in St. Louis.
As Chief of Press Control, Mr. Gerecke's chief responsi-
bility was to supervise the investigation of possible newspaper
licensees and the selection of those to be recommended for
approval by General McClure's headquarters. The area ex-
tended almost 300 miles from Aschaffenburg, near Frank furt-
am-Main, southeast to Berchtesgaden on the Austrian border,
opposite Salzburg. On a northeast-southwest line, the terri-
tory stretched almost as far— from Hof , on the Russian zone
border, to Kempten, where the American zone reached to
Switzerland and the French occupation zone. Within this area
lay such important German communities as Munich, Niirnberg,
Regensburg, Landshut, Coburg, Wurzburg, Augsburg, Bay-
reuth, Bamberg, Passau, Garmisch, Rosenheim, Ingolstadt,
Erlangen, Amberg, Schweinfurt and Straubing. I describe the
geographic extent of the area and list these leading cities and
towns to suggest the big task which lay before the Information
Control officers in the DISCC for Bavaria and particularly
that which lay before the Chief of the Press Control Section.
Months earlier the planners in PWD at SHAEF in Lon-
don had undertaken to draw up a list of target cities in which
newspapers were to be licensed if possible. In drawing up this
list, geographical distribution, regional needs and other factors
were kept in mind. Bombing damage and other effects of the
war were expected to influence the list and to make it neces-
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sary to omit some communities, or to delay the granting of
newspaper licenses in them, and to add others.
With the target list as his guide, Mr. Gerecke went to
work. His small staff of Press Control officers he divided into
groups which he assigned to parts of the whole territory.
Thus, while one Press Control team was working in the
Munich area, others were sorting out possible licensees in
other sections of Bavaria. From the outset, Mr. Gerecke made
it a cardinal principle to insist on a sound business basis for
the licensees. He found that previous directives and the Man-
ual for the Control of German Information Services did not
go far enough in assuring the licensees protection against sub-
sequent possibly embarrasing claims by previous Nazi owners
of the publishing plants. This proved to be a most important
consideration. As recently as last winter, Werner Friedmann,
one of the editors of the Suddeutsche Zeitung of Munich,
was in the United States, appealing to American editors to
help prevent an early return of plants of the free newspapers
to their former Nazi owners. My latest information is that
this danger is at least temporarily allayed.
I wish I might describe in detail the newspaper licensing
ceremonies. After an early experiment at Aachen, the first
newspaper licensed was the Frankfurter Rundschau, in the
6871 DISCC area. The licensing program proceeded slowly
as Press Control officers, Military Government officers and
Intelligence officers joined in investigating, or "vetting,"
to use the term then common, the many hundreds of possible
editors and publishers. Other early papers licensed were those
in the American enclave of Bremen and in the American
sector of Berlin. It was my good fortune to be in Berlin,
September 27, 1945, when, in an impressive ceremony, the
license was formally presented by Lieutenant Colonel Fred-
erick Leonard to the editor of Dcr Tagespiegcl. I think you
can imagine what it meant to residents of the American sector
of the city so recently ruled by Hitler's dictatorial hand to have
a newspaper which could publish without being censored in
advance.
The licensing of the SilddeutscJic Zeitung at Munich,
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October 6, 1945, gave Bavaria its first free newspaper. When
we consider this date in terms of V-E day, May 8, we see that
just five months passed before an indigenous newspaper was
licensed in that important area. If this seems a long time, let
me assure you that it was none too long to be sure about the
worthiness of the licensees and their merits in relation to the
many other prospects under consideration. I do not think there
is much question but that the pressure on Military Government
for a licensed newspaper would have been so great that a
paper would have appeared much earlier under Military Gov-
ernment than under Information Control.
The Press Control detachment for Munich, which in-
cluded Dr. Joseph Dunner, now chairman of the Department
of Government at Grinnell College, and David Davidson, a
member of the last staff of the New York World and since
the war author of an occupation novel. The Steeper Cliff,
interviewed or investigated nearly 500 possible licensees.
Those found worthy of further investigation were checked
also by Military Government, by Military Intelligence and by
Counter Intelligence Corps. Old records were searched. Ac-
quaintances, associates and former officials were sought out
and questioned as to their knowledge concerning those under
investigation. The hope was that four licensees, representing
a wide range of political opinion, could be chosen. In the end
four names were selected for final approval. But before the
license was granted, late information led to the disqualification
of one. Those who passed the stern tests and stood up to
receive the coveted statement of authority to print a news-
paper were: August Schwingenstein, Dr. Franz Joseph Scho-
ningh and Edmund Goldschagg.
Let me try to give you a quick view of that ceremony for
it was full of meaning. Munich ranked with Berlin and Niirn-
berg as a center of Nazi interest and demonstration. Moreover,
it was the city in which Hitler's party established its great
publishing plant, from which issued the party's Vblkischer
Beobachter. For years Hitler and Goebbels used the Vblkischer
Beobachter as a principal journalistic outlet. In this vast print-
ing plant, one of the very finest in all the world, the Americans
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found neatly stacked type for Mein Kampf, arranged by pages,
the lines for each page tied together and pieces of cardboard
separating one page of type from the other. Many pages of
this type were moved from the propaganda plant to the make-
shift quarters of the new paper, near Munich's historic
Rathaus.
The building was severely damaged in the bombing raids
and some parts of it were still open to the rain which fell
that day. After an amusing local folk performance, concerning
the Munchener Kindel, as portrayed by a pretty blonde girl,
Army authorities, licensees, employees of the new paper and
spectators went inside. There the type for pages of Mein
Kampf was distributed to Colonel McMahon, Mr. Gerecke,
Dr. Dunner and others who represented the American military
authority in the licensing of the paper. In turn I took a page
of the type, stepped up on a platform and dropped into the
melting pot the lines from that book of hate and prejudice.
This Nazi type melted and fused with other metal. Then it
was released into the casting machine and molded into the
pages for the first free post-war newspaper in Bavaria.
It made little difference that the windows were bombed
out, that the roof needed patching, that the mechanical equip-
ment was inadequate. The licensees, the German officials, and
the spectators all knew the significance of the occasion. Munich
had a newspaper such as it had never had before. The eager-
ness with which those first copies were grabbed off the press
and passed to outstretched hands in the pressroom told more
eloquently than words what it meant to people who had been
ordered for more than a decade what they must believe and
what they must do.
In the months of October and November, 1945, eight more
newspaper licenses were granted in Bavaria. The names of the
cities, papers, licensees and dates of the ceremonies were as
follows: Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Hochland-Bote, Anton
Lutz, October 8; Niirnberg, Numberger Nachrichten, Dr.
Joseph E. Drexel, October 10; Hof, Frankenpost, Hans Seidel,
Dioszeghi Tibor gen. Yost, October 12; Regensburg, Mittel-
bayerische Zeitung, Karl Friedrich Esser, October 23;
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Rosenheim, Oberbayerisches Volksblatt, Leonhard Lang,
Ernst Haenisch, October 26; Augsburg, Schwdbische Landcs-
seitung, Johann Wilhelm Naumann and Curt Frenzel, October
30; Wiirzburg, Main-Post, Heinrich G. Merkel and Richard
Seubert, November 24; and Aschaffenburg, Main-Echo,
August Graf, November 24.
At Augsburg the investigations and other work which led
to the licensing of the excellent Schwdbische Landeszeitung
was almost entirely an activity of Capt. Richard B. Scudder
of the Newark (N. J.) Evening News.
These licensings always were ceremonial occasions. If the
Rathaus, or Town Hall, had come through the bombings with-
out serious damage, it was usually the scene of the ceremony.
That meant the place was often a room several centuries old.
As the Miinchener Kindel participated in Munich so were
local folk customs celebrated in other communities. Music
invariably had a place on the program and frequently there
was a humorous recitation. Usually the folk dress of the com-
munitv moved among the uniforms and the neat formally
black clothes of Biirgomeister and other officials.
With the departure of Colonel McMahon for a long de-
layed rest and rehabilitation period in the United States, I
succeeded him as commanding officer of 6870 DISCC. Pre-
viously I had served the unit first as Plans and Operations
Officer and then as Executive Officer. I also conducted the
unit's liaison to Military Government headquarters in Munich
and to the Third Army headquarters at Bad Tolz. While
General Patton was in command, our unit was established as
a part of the Third Army organization. Colonel McMahon
was the Information Control officer on General Patton's staff
and I was his deputy. We reported to Major General Hobart
R. Gay, Chief of Staff, and to Colonel Paul D. Harkins,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Our mission was strongly supported by General Patton's
successor, Lieutenant General Lucien K. Truscott, who im-
mediately, on his transfer to Bavaria from Italy, saw its
importance. But General Truscott did more than express his
appreciation of what DISCC was doing. When the new
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licensees, under Information Control sponsorship, formed an
organization of publishers, General Truscott attended the
meeting and, through a translater, addressed the Germans on
the part they were to play in the development of a free nation.
This man-to-man personal appearance of the Commanding
General made a great impression on the Germans.
General Truscott also showed his interest by helping us
with personnel as the point system began to take our men
home. And he kept track of what we were doing through
our oral reports at Saturday morning staff meetings at Bad
Tolz and our weekly mimeographed summaries of progress.
The Press Control Section continued its hard work with
the result that I personally enjoyed the satisfaction of licensing
six newspapers in the months of December and January.
These were:
Donau-Kurier, at Ingolstadt, license to Joseph Lackas, Decem-
ber ii, 1945.
Der Allgduer, at Kempten, license to Dr. C. Rathgeb and Dr.
Hans Falk, December 13.
Frankische Presse, at Bayreuth, license to Julius Steeger, De-
cember 18.
Frdnkischer Tag, at Bamberg, license to Walter Meiss and Georg
Wirth, January 8, 1946.
Isar-Post, at Landshut, license to Richard Schlochauer and Dr.
Georg Pix, January 15.
Neue Presse, at Coburg, license to Peter Maslowski, January 15.
The temptation is to tell you something of each of these
occasions, but I know that we do not have the time. General
McClure visited us just at the occasion of the licensing of the
Isar-Post at Landshut so it was possible for him to take part
in the ceremony in that old city with its buildings strangely
reminiscent of the Hanseatic League towns. At Coburg we
were in the community made famous by a concentration of
exiled and retired royalty who must have thought little of the
idea of a free press anywhere. Bayreuth was the center of the
great Wagnerian operatic productions. To keep our licensing
date in Kempten we traveled some 75 miles in a blizzard. On
the arrival of my party I found that a large audience had been
waiting in an unheated room for the opportunity to witness the
licensing ceremony.
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Every time I stood before one of those gatherings I had
the feeling that I was looking at faces I had seen before. This
was because I grew up among people with German back-
grounds in the Southern Illinois town of Collinsville. Here
was a face I had seen years before in the Adolf Meyer baker
shop. There a face that took me back to Karl Gindler's meat
market. Here a face that brought to mind Fritz Wiese who
was a carpenter for my father. I came to realize as I had
never quite known before how heavily the emigrants from
Germany had influenced American life.
Each licensing ceremony was an opportunity to teach a
lesson about democracy and its dependence upon a free press
and an informed public. German newspapers before Hitler
were highlv partisan. There were very fewr efforts at pre-
senting the news fairly and accurately. Independent comment
was virtually unknown. At first the editors of the licensed
papers found it hard to conceive of a press which kept news
and editorials separate.
I recall so well the puzzlement of one of the subeditors of
the HocJiland-Botc at Garmisch-Partenkirchen. He was in-
credulous that any editor would throw away his chance to
influence his readers by eliminating editorial comment from
his page one news articles. But the idea did catch on and
quickly. Soon the licensed papers were in a kind of competi-
tion to see which could print the most news items from over
the world.
Verv few restrictions were imposed by Information Con-
trol. The policies drawn up in the planning section of PWD
established the rule that there would be no pre-publication
censorship. After publication, the papers were read by the
Press Control officers in an exercise of what the Manual
called "post-publication scrutiny."
When the editors exceeded fair bounds they were cau-
tioned and if necessary warned by the Press Control officers.
At the outset criticism of the Army of Occupation and its
personnel and policies was forbidden by official directives. As
the editors proved themselves, they established their right to
be allowed to criticize. Then this restriction was relaxed and
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suggestions were made in the papers and policies discussed
and commented on.
The licensed papers were linked in a telegraphic press asso-
ciation similar to the Associated Press and the United Press.
Called DENA, it was set up on a cooperative basis. At first
it was supervised by Americans who trained German reporters
and bureau workers. Eventually DENA, too, was licensed to
the Germans. Today this news agency gathers from the United
States, Europe and other areas some 150,000 words of news
from Reuters, the State Department, the Reorientation Branch
of the Army and other sources. This collection of news is
reduced to about 30,000 words which are sent to all licensed
newspapers.
The licensing program has progressed to the point where
more than 50 papers now possess formal authority to publish
under the American Army of Occupation. Some of these pub-
lish daily, others two, three or four times a week. The lack
of newsprint continues to be a limiting factor as it was from
the beginning. Some editors prefer to issue fewer pages per
issue and to appear oftener. Others prefer larger issues fewer
times a week. The range is 18 to 34 pages a week, distributed
according to the number of days of issue a week. Thus, the
licensed press of the American zone in Germany issues about
as many pages a week as American papers present in a day.
Circulation also affects the newsprint problem. Some six
months after the licensing program started, circulation figures
ranged from 35,000 for the paper at Rosenheim and 42,000
for that at Garmisch to 200,000 for those at Regensburg and
Augsburg and 410,000 for the SilddeutscJie Zeitung at
Munich.
I described earlier the Publishing Operations Section of
PWD (later of ICD). The overtly American newspapers—
in the German language— which this section issued began to
disappear as the licensed papers made their appearance. Finally
the efforts of this section and the staff which it had assembled
from military and civilian sources were concentrated in one
newspaper, Die Neite Zeitung. Designed to present and in-
terpret life in the United States and American aims in
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Germany, this handsomely printed paper was issued under the
editorship of Captain Habe from the Volkischer Beobachter
plant in Munich. Copies were then transported throughout
Western Germany and to the American sector of Berlin.
Shortage of personnel created problems for these PWD
and ICD activities as it did for Military Government. The
DISCC tables of organization never were filled to strength
and had they been the total personnel for the tasks still would
have been fewer than was needed. When the point system for
return to the United States began to operate, sped along by
the hue and cry of parents and wives to "get the boys home,"
staffs which were too small were reduced so fast as to amount
almost to a breakdown in supervision. This was true of virtu-
ally all military activities and responsibilities.
The Press Control Section at 6870 DISCC is a case in
point. After six months of work on the licensing program,
Arthur Gerecke returned to the United States and was suc-
ceeded by Lieutenant Colonel Gustav Ring, former Washing-
ton newspaperman, who was sent over from Ordnance in the
United States after hostilities had ceased. He in turn was
succeeded by Ernst Langendorf, a former GI, who had served
in the Munich Press Control detachment. Thus did this post
quickly change hands as American personnel hurried away
from one of the greatest responsibilities and greatest oppor-
tunities in history.
This reduction in personnel meant it was impossible for
the Press Control Section to keep up with the licensed news-
papers sufficiently to be sure that they were not exceeding
their directives. Eventually, Information Control was brought
under Military Government and the DISCCs became units in
MG. Thus, 6870, for example, became IDC, Office of Military
Government, Bavaria. This change was made while I was in
command of the unit. It completed the full administrative
cycle for me.
But Military Government also lost men right and left and
so was in no position to help Information Control on per-
sonnel. One of the places in which results were unhappiest at
times was on Die Neue Zeitung. Not long ago a former Nazi
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sympathizer was left in charge of the paper. Some of the state-
ments appearing under his editorship made the American
effort ridiculous. My latest information is that there have been
some ousters and that the United States authority is taking a
firm and more consistent hand in the paper's conduct.
There are several other American-sponsored publications
which deserve more attention than we can give them. The
Americanische Rundschau which was started in 1945, was in-
tended to appeal to intellectual Germans. The expectation was
that it would have a circulation of perhaps 15,000. Yet so
hungry were Germans for information from the outside world
that the circulation shot up to 28,000 and each copy had no
one knows how many readers on a hand-to-hand basis. While
the circulation is not so large now that many indigenous
German magazines have been licensed, still it holds up to
20,000 or better.
The best way to appraise such a circulation in Germany is
to remember that it is larger than the circulation of similar
magazines in the United States. For example, Foreign Affairs
has 18,000 and The American Scholar, which is published by
Phi Beta Kappa, has 12,000. It is to be remembered, too, that
the circulations of Foreign Affairs and The American Scholar
are in a nation of 150,000,000 people while the Amerikanischc
Rundschau circulates in an area of some 40,000,000 people.
Neue Auslesc is a monthly on' the order of Reader s Digest
and Coronet, but on a somewhat higher level. It is published
by the British and Americans jointly. In the fortieth month of
operation, its current circulation is about 150,000. This widely
quoted review has been of much help in informing the
Germans as to what the rest of the post-war world is like.
Still a third American sponsored magazine in the German
language is Hcutc, an illustrated periodical on the order of
Life. It has the very large circulation of about 800,000. These
magazines were edited and issued in part at least under the
Publishing Operations Section of PWD and ICD. It was hard
for them to retain their able personnel of the war years. Few
who stayed on were of the caliber of H. Peter Hart, who had
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served as a military intelligence officer and later was Chief of
the Intelligence Section of 6870 DISCC.
Before I close permit me to refer at least briefly to related
aspects of the Information Control program. At the same
time the Press Control Section was investigating applicants
to publish newspapers, the Publications Control Section was
reviewing the records of Germans who wanted to publish
magazines of varied kinds or to open up book publishing
operations. After careful check licenses were granted in these
fields in a manner similar to that in newspaper publishing.
Information Control was responsible for the production
of a weekly newsreel for German moving picture theaters.
These theaters also were licensed formally as were musical
groups, orchestras and legitimate theaters. Occasions to re-
member include the production at the 1945 Christmas season
of Offenbach's Talcs of Hoffman, long banned by the Nazis,
and Thornton Wilder's Our Town, which the Germans called
Eine Kleine Stadt. The "German cast brought out the univer-
sality of this Pulitzer Prize play. I am sure all Americans who
saw it in Munich or elsewhere were impressed by the kinship
between Germans and Americans which the play so clearly
brought out.
Please excuse me if I close on a grim note. After serving
into 1946 with ICD, I agreed to spend two months as an edi-
torial advisor to The Stars and Stripes with a view to ac-
quainting the staff with basic occupation policies and thus to
help the staff avoid unnecessary controversy and possible
censorship trouble. While on this assignment in June, 1946,
I was asked by the Chief of the Information and Education
Division, United States Forces, European Theater, to witness
and write the news report on the hanging of twenty-eight of
the men who ran the murder mill at Dachau. You may re-
member that this was the largest number of executions ever
conducted by United States authority, military or civilian, and
that it preceded the executions of those who later received the
death penalty at the International Military Tribunal in
Nurnberg.
The Dachau executions were conducted on twin scaffolds
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in the prison yard onto which Hitler looked when he was
writing Mein Kampf in his cell at Landsberg. Fourteen hang-
ings took place on each of two days, seven in the forenoon,
seven in the afternoon. After I saw the first group hanged, I
got in touch by telephone with Lieutenant Colonel Gustav
Ring, then chief of the Press Control Section and told him
that I thought a representative group of the licensed German
editors should be permitted to witness the remaining execu-
tions. After phone calls to Frankfurt and Berlin the attend-
ance of representative German editors on the second day was
authorized. Lieutenant Colonel Ring gathered a group of
German editors together and took them to Landsberg for the
second day on the condition that what they wrote would be
available to all licensed German papers.
One of these German editors had that day what must have
been as strange an experience as ever befell any newspaper-
man. For that editor had been an inmate of Dachau and
among those who was inhuman to him in the camp was one
of the fourteen war criminals scheduled in the second group
of executions. That editor saw his abuser come out of the
prison, mount the thirteen steps, submit to the hood and noose
and then drop out of sight when the trap was sprung. He must
have realized even more than anyone else among the silent
spectators that Nazi brutality inevitably brought on its own
undoing.
You have been patient in hearing this long narrative. I
hope you feel with me that the creation of a free press in
Germany, can be a factor in producing that fairer, saner
Europe for which we all hope so much. And so we are back
to today and the lifting of the blockade that made life so
difficult in the American, French, and British sectors of
Berlin.
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THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION
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The United Nations came into operation in January, 1946,
following more than two years of international negotiations
for its establishment and the completion of arrangements for
bringing its Charter into effect. Its foundations were laid at
the Moscow Conference of October, 1943. Its basic framework
was determined at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944
and, in some important respects, at the Crimea Conference of
1945. Its final Charter was written at the San Francisco Con-
ference, which lasted from April until June, 1945. That
Charter came into effect on October 24, 1945, when the last
of the requisite number of ratifications had been deposited
in the Department of State. It might be noted parenthetically
that of the twenty-eight ratifications that were required, the
first was deposited by the United States and the twenty-eighth
By the Soviet Union. Although the United Nations thus be-
came a reality almost exactly four months after its Charter
had been signed, the actual functioning of the Organization
did not begin until the first General Assembly met in London
on January 10, 1946, set up the Security and the Economic
and Social Councils, the International Court of Justice, and the
Secretariat, and thus provided the necessary machinery of
operation.
During the four years that have elapsed, the United Nations
has assembled an international staff four times as large as
the League of Nations had at its peak and has developed an
immense amount of activity in many directions. It is charged
by its Charter with the performance of two main sets of func-
tions: those that relate to the maintenance of international
peace and security ; and those that concern the creation in the
world of conditions of political, economic and social stability
and progress, both as means of promoting the general welfare
and as prerequisites to the maintenance of peace and security.
delivered May 2, 1950.
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During the short period of its existence, the United Nations
has been called upon to give its attention to most phases of
these two broad sets of functions. In fact, hardly a question
or a controversy of any importance has arisen during these
difficult and uneasy postwar years that has not been, in one
way or another, brought before that Organization. I propose,
first of all, to review briefly some of the numerous and varied
activities undertaken to date by the United Nations.
I
More than a dozen international controversies have so far
been dealt with by the United Nations. All of them have in-
volved grave threats to peaceful relations among nations. Some
of them have been marked by outbursts of armed clashes.
Within the first few weeks after the United Nations began
to operate, it was confronted with two dangerous interna-
tional situations arising out of the presence of foreign troops
on the territories of independent countries. The first pertained
to the continued presence in Iran of Soviet troops, which were
maintained there in spite of a promise made by the Soviet
Union to withdraw them. The second related to the presence
of British and French troops on the territory of Syria and
Lebanon. This latter case involved a complaint by the govern-
ments of Syria and Lebanon, directed particularly against the
French, to the effect that France was laying down conditions
for the withdrawal of its troops that could not possibly be
accepted by independent states. The Syria-Lebanon contro-
versy was settled easily and quickly on the basis of the Se-
curity Council's views expressed to the countries concerned,
in spite of the fact that it was in connection with it that the
Soviet Union cast its first veto. The Iranian case was much
more difficult; but in the end it, too, was settled by the with-
drawal of Soviet troops.
A more complicated situation was presented by the case
of Greece, which involved the operation on Greek soil of
guerilla formations equipped, supported, and guided by the
three neighboring countries— Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Al-
bania— obviously backed by the Soviet Union. This situation
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is quiescent now, although it is impossible, of course, to
determine the relative weights that should be assigned to the
action taken by the Council and Assembly of the United
Nations, to the changed position of Yugoslavia, to direct
United States assistance to the Greek Government, and to the
efforts of Greece itself.
One of the most protracted and, in some ways, difficult
cases that has had to be dealt with by the United Nations has
been that of Palestine. That situation involved bitter armed
and verbal clashes and a process of political adjustment
charged with high emotional tension. In the course of the pro-
longed discussions and negotiations that took place, hostilities
were finally brought to an end, and an immediate settlement,
reasonably satisfactory to all concerned, was effected. Two
aspects of this situation still remain. One pertains to the future
status of the city of Jerusalem, which is still very much on the
Organization's agenda, and the other to the conclusion of a
permanent settlement.
The Korean situation with which the United Nations has
had to deal, presents another piece of unfinished business still
before the United Nations. The efforts by the latter to bring
about at least an expression of the wishes on the future of the
entire country by the population of both northern Korea,
which is under Soviet influence and control, and of southern
Korea, which has been set up as an independent state, have
so far been frustrated by the obstruction of the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the Indonesian problem, another of the
very difficult cases before the United Nations, may be regarded
as having reached a point of satisfactory solution. Here the
course of events involved bitter fighting between the Indo-
nesians and the Dutch, and the final settlement represented a
tremendous effort of successful mediation under the auspices
of the United Nations.
Some of the problems raised by the transformation of
India and Pakistan from the status of a British dependency
into that of two autonomous dominions have been, for some
time, on the doorstep of the United Nations. They have in-
volved particularly a sharp controversy between the two new
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dominions over the disposition of the Kashmir area, a con-
troversy greatly aggravated by the existence of a vast refugee
problem on both sides of the India-Pakistan frontier. In recent
months, this problem has moved toward a possible solution
under the auspices of the United Nations through a process of
mediation.
The United Nations has been confronted with a contro-
versy between Great Britain and Albania arising out of the
sinking of a British warship by mines which, Great Britain
claimed, were illegally placed by Albania. This controversy
appears to be on the way to solution through the International
Court of Justice, to which the Security Council of the United
Nations recommended that it be referred by the parties.
The United Nations has handled a controversy between
India and the Union of South Africa over the treatment of
the Indian population on the territory of the Union. This prob-
lem has moved towards solution through negotiations between
the nations concerned, undertaken on the basis of a recom-
mendation of the General Assembly.
Several problems growing out of the peace settlements
with the former enemy states have found their way into the
United Nations. Although it was understood from the outset
that the negotiation of peace treaties would not be a function
carried out by the United Nations, and although, in fact, the
treaties with Italy and the satellite countries were concluded
outside the framework of the Organization, two special prob-
lems relating to the Italian treaty were handed over to the
United Nations. When the major powers could not agree on
the disposition to be made of Trieste, a solution was found by
way of setting up a free territory there to be administered
under the control of the Security Council. The Council ac-
cepted the responsibility, but has failed completely to date to
agree on the selection of the governor for the territory.
Similarly, when no agreement was reached in the peace nego-
tiations concerning the future of the Italian colonies, the
negotiators finally agreed to request the General Assembly of
the United Nations to settle the question, and promised in
{72}
advance to abide by its decision. This has now been done with
regard to all of the former Italian colonies with the exception
of Eritrea, the disposition of which remains as a part of the
Organization's unfinished business. More recently, the General
Assembly has been called upon to deal with the charges that
the provisions of the peace treaties with the satellite states
dealing with basic human rights have been violated.
Perhaps the most spectacular piece of business put on the
agenda of the United Nations Security Council to date has
been the controversy between the United States, Great Britain,
and France on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the
other, arising out of the Berlin blockade. Although the Se-
curity Council could not take any action with regard to this
problem, eventually informal conversations in the United Na-
tions led to the Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers a year
ago, which resulted in the lifting of the blockade.
The recent events in China have been prominently before
the United Nations and have become focussed on the contro-
versy over the unseating of the representatives of the Nation-
alist Government and the seating of representatives of the
Communist regime. Today the problem of China presents
itself in the form of an impasse, high-lighted by the Soviet
Union's wholesale walkout from the Security Council and
from the other continuing organs and agencies of the United
Nations.
In the same domain of the maintenance of international
peace and security, the United Nations has been confronted
from the very start with the vast congeries of problems revolv-
ing around the control of atomic energy and the regulation of
conventional armaments. Decisions to undertake efforts to
solve these problems were made in 1946, and two commissions,
specially set up for the task, have been struggling ever since
unsuccessfully to find answers acceptable to everybody con-
cerned. Apparently irreconcilable differences have developed
between the Soviet Union and the other participants in the
efforts. All told, this may be regarded as the most conspicuous
failure of the United Nations in its operations to date.
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II
In the other great domain of the Organization's activity—
the fostering of conditions of stability and progress — a cen-
tral place belongs to the efforts to promote international
economic cooperation. Here, the United Nations as an organi-
zation shares responsibility with a number of specialized
agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-
national Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
national Labor Organization, and the Food and Agriculture
Organization. The Charter of the United Nations left for
future action the establishment of a relationship between these
specialized agencies and the Organization itself, to be effected,
under the authority of the General Assembly, by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council. The legal relationships have been
completed, although many operating difficulties still remain to
be ironed out.
In its own activities, the Economic and Social Council has
been responsible for inaugurating a series of negotiations
which led to the conclusion of agreements for the establish-
ment of an International Trade Organization. The Charter,
establishing that agency and setting up a comprehensive sys-
tem of organized international relations in the sphere of inter-
national trade and commerce, is now before the Congress of
the United States for ratification or rejection by this country.
The Economic and Social Council has also undertaken many
activities to improve international economic relations through
its commissions at Lake Success and through regional eco-
nomic commissions established by it in Europe and elsewhere.
The General Assembly and, under it, the Economic and
Social Council are charged by the Charter of the United
Nations with various responsibilities in the humanitarian and
cultural fields and in the promotion of basic human rights. The
Assembly, the Council, and the latter's appropriate commis-
sions have been active in all of these fields through their own
efforts and in cooperation with such specialized agencies as the
UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the Refugee Or-
ganization, and others. Agreement has already been reached
on the text of a declaration relating to the observance of basic
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human rights and on conventions on freedom of information
and genocide.
Still another field of international relations, with regard
to which the United Nations has responsibilities under its
Charter, is the treatment of non-self-governing territories.
Here the principal agencies of the United Nations are the
General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship
Council. The central feature in this field of activity has been
the creation of a trusteeship system for such territories as are
not under the control of single independent nations in the form
of colonial areas. The United Nations has now successfully
accomplished the transformation of all but one of the former
mandated territories that have not become independent states
into trust areas, through the negotiation of appropriate agree-
ments with the countries that have assumed trusteeship re-
sponsibilities— the United States for the former Japanese
mandated islands; Great Britain, France, and Belgium for
the areas over which they had formerly had mandate rights.
The one piece of unfinished business in this regard concerns the
future of the former German Southwest Africa, over which
the Union of South Africa has a mandate and which the
Government of the Union now wishes to annex outright. The
legal aspects of this question are before the International Court
of Justice. In this same field, arrangements have been made
for carrying out the very important innovation that was intro-
duced into the Charter of the United Nations, under which
countries responsible for colonial areas undertook to report
to the United Nations on developments within those areas, but
there are still some serious difficulties in that connection.
Finally, mention should be made of the efforts by the
United Nations to promote the development of international
law. This was one of the great responsibilities given by the
Charter to the General Assembly, and the Assembly has been
attempting to carry out the task by creating facilities through
which both the codification of existing international law and
the expansion of the area of international relations coming
within the purview of international law can be most effectively
promoted.
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Ill
Apart from the activities, some of which I have just de-
scribed, that relate to the substance of international relations,
the United Nations has been confronted with a number of
problems pertaining more specifically to its own organization.
One of these concerns the admission of new members. The
United Nations started with fifty-one nations entitled to the
privileges of original membership and a provision for the ad-
mission of new members, which was to be effected by the
action of the Security Council and the General Assembly.
Since then, eight countries have been admitted into the United
Nations. Fourteen others have applied for membership, but
their applications are still pending. In this connection, a very
sharp difference of view has developed between the Soviet
Union and the other principal members of the Organization.
The Soviet Union has set up a theory that it has a right to
object to the admission of countries sponsored by the other
countries, if the other countries object to the admission of
countries sponsored by itself. The other principal members of
the United Nations contend that each application should be
considered on its own merit. This controversy has been re-
ferred to the International Court for an advisory opinion ; and
although the Court's judgment has been adverse to the Soviet
contention, the problem of admitting pending applicants is still
completely deadlocked. In fact, most of the Soviet vetoes cast
to date have been in connection with the admission of new
members.
One of the very important features of the United Nations
that was left for future determination at the time that the
Charter was adopted was the conclusion of agreements under
which the member states would place at the disposal of the
Security Council such armed forces and facilities as the latter
would need in the performance of its functions. An effort to
negotiate these agreements was inaugurated shortly after the
United Nations entered into operation when the Security
Council instructed its Military Staff Committee to work on
the matter. In the course of this activity, sharp differences
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developed between the Soviet representatives and those of the
other countries, and so far no solution has been found.
Another important problem of internal organization has
arisen out of the fact that, although the Charter charges the
General Assembly with the performance of very important
functions in the field of peace and security, adequate ma-
chinery for the performance of these functions was not pro-
vided for in the Charter itself, but was left to future deter-
mination by the Assembly. An attempt to meet this need was
made some time ago through a proposal to create what has
become known as the Little Assembly— that is, a commission
representative of all of the members of the Assembly, capable
of meeting at any time throughout the intervals between the
regular annual meetings of the Assembly itself. A special
impetus to this development was provided by the accumula-
tion of difficulties in the Security Council and the growing
tendency to place matters relating to peace and security before
the General Assembly. This commission was, in fact, created,
but the Soviet Union, which opposed the move, refused from
the start to participate in its work and boycotted it long before
the more recent general Soviet walkout in connection with the
Chinese question.
IV
This, in all too brief outline, is the record to date of the
United Nations in action. It is necessarily incomplete, but it
hits the high spots. It is, I think, an impressive record, although
a decidedly mixed one. It is a story of success and failure,
achievement and frustration, and— perhaps above all— of
hope and discouragement.
Many difficulties of many different kinds have attended
the work of the United Nations during its four years of opera-
tion. Some of them have been peculiar to the organization
itself— a new piece of international machinery through which
the nations have been struggling with the problems of peace,
stability, and progress in the aftermath of the most widespread
and destructive war in history. Most of them— and, by all
odds, the most important ones— have resulted from the fact
that the work of the United Nations, which is a voluntarv
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association of sovereign states, has been, and must necessarily
be, a reflection of what takes place in international relations
in general.
By far the most serious difficulties that have confronted
the United Nations have resulted from the attitude and be-
havior of the Soviet Union. Whatever reasons had prompted
the Soviet leaders to take a very active part in the negotia-
tions that led to the establishment of the United Nations, ever
since the Organization and the many agencies that cluster
around it began to operate, the Soviet Union has pursued a
policy of non-cooperation and obstruction.
It refused from the start to accept membership in the
specialized agencies, most of which had been created with its
full participation. The only exception was the World Health
Organization, from which it has now withdrawn. As already
noted, it has refused to take part in the Little Assembly, as
well as in a number of other activities of the United Nations.
It has now climaxed its policy of non-cooperation by its gen-
eral boycott of United Nations activities because the repre-
sentation of China in the various agencies has not been
arranged to its satisfaction. Its policy of obstruction has op-
erated in all the organs and agencies of the United Nations,
although it has centered particularly in the Security Council,
because that is the only organ of the United Nations in which
the veto privilege applies, whereas the decisions of all the
other organs and agencies are governed by a majority vote. In
fact, the veto question has become symbolic of all the difficul-
ties experienced by the United Nations, even though it has
affected only some of the many and varied activities of that
Organization.
In view of the prominence that the veto question has
assumed in the discussion regarding the United Nations, it is
well, perhaps, to pause for a few minutes and take a look at
' what the veto is all about. When the original plans for a post-
war international organization were being developed, there
were two great issues that had to be resolved. One of these
pertained to the kind and extent of authority to be given the
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United Nations. The other related to the voting procedures by
which that authority would be exercised.
In the field of the maintenance of international peace and
security, a choice had to be made between giving the new
organization the authority to settle international disputes and
to enforce its decisions, or empowering it only to promote and
facilitate the settlement of international controversies and dis-
putes by the nations themselves. Those who determined this
country's position and the representatives of the other coun-
tries participating in the international negotiations, came to
the conclusion that it was not possible to go beyond the second
alternative. Without passing on the theoretical possibility that
some day an international organization might be created which
would have the authority and the means to settle all inter-
national controversies, the negotiators formulated the Charter
of the United Nations in terms of vesting in the Organization
authority only to promote and foster peaceful adjustment and
pacific settlement of disputes, rather than of providing for
enforceable settlement of such disputes.
There was, however, another phase of this situation. It
pertained to whether or not the Organization should be em-
powered to use armed force, not to enforce the settlement of
international disputes, but to prevent the nations from using
force individually as a means of international action. Our
policy makers and those of the other countries were in agree-
ment that to this extent the new international organization
should be endowed with the authority and the means of keep-
ing the peace. This was done on the theory that, if resort to
violence could be eliminated, the processes of peaceful adjust-
ment and pacific settlement could be made operative.
In connection with both phases of the situation, and espe-
cially the latter, it was necessary to decide whether the new
organization would function, as had the League of Nations,
on the basis of unanimity of all its members, or of application
to all its decisions of some sort of a majority vote, or on the
basis of a combination of the two procedures. This point was
of particular concern to the major nations, since it was clear
that any system of joint international action for the main-
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tenance of peace and security would impose upon them
special responsibilities, in that they would have to provide the
bulk of the forces and resources necessary for such joint
action.
This country and the other major nations were willing to
see the Organization operate on the basis of a majority rule
in every respect, except in the use of force and in those
activities closely connected with the possibility of using force.
So far as those of us who were working on this problem in
Washington were concerned, it appeared clear at the time that
the American people would not consent to a situation in which
American armed forces could be used for joint international
action without this country's consent. I might add that most of
those of us who were concerned in the Government with the
formulation of basic policies in this regard were also con-
vinced that, given the current and prospective circumstances
of international relations, this country should not consent to
such an arrangement.
It was obvious that the only way in which the United
States could safeguard itself in this regard was to have a
system under which no decision involving the actual or poten-
tial use of armed force could be made without its consent. It
was equally obvious that the only way in which this could be
done in practice was for the same principle to apply to the
other major nations. In other words, the system of voting
would have to be such that any decisions of the kind that I
have just described would require the unanimous consent of
the major nations. This is the so-called veto.
There were no illusions as to the limitations that such an
arrangement would impose upon the effectiveness of the pro-
posed organization, nor as to the possibility that the great
privilege which the major nations thus claimed for themselves
might be abused. It was clear that under such a system any one
of the major nations would be in a position, not only to stop
action against itself, but to stop any collective action. The
underlying theory, however, was that if one of the major
nations were to prove recalcitrant, or were to refuse to abide
by the rules of international behavior that were being inscribed
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in the Charter, a situation would be created in which the
recalcitrant nation might have to be coerced ; and it was ap-
parent that no major nation could be coerced except by the
combined forces of the other major nations. This would be
the equivalent of a world war, and a decision to embark upon
such a war would necessarily have to be made by each of the
other major nations for itself and not by any international
organization
It might be pertinent to ask this question: What reason
did those who worked on the creation of the United Nations
have to believe that the Organization they were constructing
would succeed? The answer to this question, I think, is rela-
tively simple. All signatories of the Charter were pledging
themselves to follow a set of rules of international behavior
which, if faithfully observed, would offer the best chance that
international peace and security would be preserved. The hope
at the time was that the nations— especially the major ones
— then going through the gigantic effort of winning the war
had learned the tragic lesson that only unity among the peace-
seeking nations in support of the preservation of peace could
make enduring peace a reality for each of them.
This basic assumption, however, did not stand alone. There
were several other fundamental assumptions involved in the
situation. The most important of these was that, after the war,
each of the major nations would maintain sufficient forces of
its own to make sure that, in combination with other nations
desiring peace, they would be in a position to make it much
too risky for any recalcitrant nation to enter upon the path
of aggression and violence. After all, nations, like individuals,
live in peace fundamentally for one of two reasons— either
because they want to live in peace or because they think that
it is too risky to break the peace.
Unfortunately, it was this last vital assumption that was
not vindicated in the period immediately following the war.
For reasons known only to themselves, the Soviet leaders
chose a course of action that led them along the dangerous
primrose path only recently trod by the Axis aggressors. At
the same time, while Soviet Russia retained much of its war-
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time military strength, the United States, the other great
pinnacle of power in the post-war world, permitted its wartime
military establishment to deteriorate out of all proportion to
the military strength still retained by the Soviet Union.
I believe that Soviet behavior, both inside and outside the
United Nations, has, to an important extent, been a result of
the dangerous disparity of actual military strength that thus
became established in the world. I am convinced that if we
had exercised the prudence of not permitting our military
strength to be drastically reduced without regard to what was
happening elsewhere in the world, many of our difficulties with
the Soviet Union would not have developed. I am also con-
vinced that our more recent efforts to increase our own mili-
tary strength, and to help the other nations that feel as we do
to increase theirs are going a long way toward redressing the
disparity of military power in the world.
In this connection, the question is often raised whether
competitive rearmament does not visually precipitate an armed
conflict. That risk undoubtedly exists. Unfortunately, the pace
of armaments is always set by the nations that intend to use
military resources for aggressive purposes. My reading of
history convinces me that {there is more risk and danger in a
continuing disparity of armed strength than in efforts to
correct that disparity.
In this same connection I have often been asked whether
an increase of our armed strength can be expected by itself to
give us the sense and the actuality of national security. My
reply to that is that there are perhaps twenty or thirty differ-
ent lines of action that must be pursued, domestically and
internationally, to give us a reasonable expectation of peace
and security. But I am also satisfied that none of these will
suffice unless we are sufficiently strong militarily to deter the
aggressor, if possible, or have a better chance of defeating
him if that should become necessary.
Be all this as it may, the United Nations has so far had
to operate in a world overwhelmingly characterized by the
situation that I have just described. Under these circumstances,
what is surprising to me is not that the United Nations has
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not been able to achieve more than it has— and I submit that,
in the light of my brief summary of its activities during the
first four years of its existence, it has accomplished a good
deal— but that it has been able to achieve as much as it has,
in spite of all its difficulties, in spite of the deplorable behavior
of the Soviet Union. I often ask myself this question: Would
the world situation during the past four years have been
better, if the United Nations did not exist? I doubt it. I am
inclined to think that the existence of the United Nations and
the new spirit of collective responsibility for the peace and
well-being of the world that has been engendered by the agree-
ment on, and adherence to, its Charter by an overwhelming
majority of the nations, have stood us in good stead during
these perilous and difficult years— and will continue to stand
us in good stead.
Nevertheless, it is quite understandable that public dis-
cussion of the United Nations, especially in this country, has
been strongly marked by a note of disappointment and dis-
illusionment. This feeling has been strengthened to a large
extent by the unfortunate fact that, when the United Nations
was created, there was a general tendency to expect much more
from it than it could possibly deliver. It should have been
crystal clear from the start that the new international organi-
zation could not be expected to transform the whole system
of relations among nations. Unfortunately, emerging as the
world was from the holocaust of a terrible war, there were
too many people who were carried away by the idea that the
mere establishment of an international organization would
perform the miracle of taking care of all our troubles.
The truth of the matter was that by establishing the United
Nations the peace-seeking nations of the world were providing
themselves with a new and important mechanism for the con-
duct of international relations, but one that was to be
supplementary to all the other machinery of international rela-
tions, rather than one that would entirely supplant the latter.
After all, the United Nations is not something suspended in
the air above the nations themselves. The United Nations is
the nations that compose it. It can help the nations to raise
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the standards of their international behavior, but it cannot
rise above the standards set by the nations themselves. I can-
not imagine a situation in which the nations would behave
like angels in the United Nations and be at each others'
throats outside the United Nations, or vice versa.
All this, I think, is good logic; but, unfortunately, it is not
the way things happen at times. There is always, naturally, a
search for simple and direct solutions, no matter how com-
plicated the problems are that clamor for solution. Hence, it
is entirely understandable that the existing widespread feeling
of disillusionment and frustration has led to a vigorous search
for other ways out, and that many proposals have been devised
for changing the United Nations system, or, as the current
phrase runs, for "strengthening" the United Nations.
V
One such proposal, which has been discussed for some
time and has just been given a new prominence, is to reor-
ganize the United Nations without the Soviet Union and its
satellites. I can well understand the feeling of utter exaspera-
tion with the Soviet Union's methods of behavior that makes
such a procedure attractive. But I see no useful purpose to be
served by deliberately releasing Soviet Russia from the obliga-
tions that it assumed when it accepted the Charter of the
United Nations. On the contrary, I can see the possibility of
using its signature on the Charter, however dishonored by its
present behavior, as a basis for moral pressure against it. I
can also see the possibility that renewed adherence to the
principles of international behavior inscribed on the Charter
may become a bridge by which Soviet Russia may return to
the family of nations once its leaders come to the conclusion
that the road they are following now can lead only to disaster.
And I would be inclined to deplore our shutting the door, by
this act of ostracism, on the desperate hopes of the peoples
who are now under the despotic rule of the leaders of Moscow.
The proponents of this proposal are not quite clear on
what would be accomplished by such an action. Its purpose
might, of course, be to convert the reorganized United Nations
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into a military coalition against Soviet imperialism. I have no
objection to such a coalition, if for no other reason than to
deter the rulers of the Kremlin from the pursuit of their
current criminal ambitions. But there are much more effective
ways of forming such a coalition without destroying the
existing Organization. In fact, to a large extent, that is pre-
cisely what is being done now in arrangements such as the
North Atlantic Treaty.
The purpose might be to intensify moral pressure on the
Soviet Union. I am completely in accord with the idea that
the free world needs imperatively a mobilization, in opposition
to communism and Soviet imperialism, not only of its military
resources, but also of all its moral and spiritual forces. But I
am convinced that there is no better place or circumstance for
doing this than within the present United Nations. Only five
months ago a powerful blow was struck on that score when
the General Assembly passed a resolution, setting forth, all
over again, the ethical code of behavior obligatory for all
peace-seeking nations. This resolution was adopted by a vote
°f 53 to 5. against violent Soviet opposition, but with Soviet
Russia there and desperately on the defensive. In my opinion,
the effect of such a resolution would not have been as great
if it had been adopted in Soviet Russia's absence.
Apart from this proposal, most of the others center around
ways of revising the existing Organization. The one that is
perhaps oftenest heard of is based on the idea that the aboli-
tion, or at least substantial modification, of the veto privilege
would sufficiently strengthen the United Nations to make it a
really effective instrument for the maintenance of peace and
security. Let us take a look at what would happen if this were
done.
Obviously, if no single nation were in a position to stop,
by its vote alone, any decision of the United Nations, a very
important limitation on action by the United Nations would
be removed. The United Nations would then be in a situation
in which, if the requisite majorities could be obtained, it would
be able not only to condemn any aggressor— this it can do
now through the General Assembly, where the veto does not
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apply— but also to make a decision to act against any member
state, including the major nations.
But would such a decision have any reality? The United
Nations would still have to have the means of enforcing it.
If the theory is correct that a major nation can be coerced
only by a combination of the forces of the other major nations,
this would mean that the United Nations would have to have
the authority to call into action, if necessary, all of the forces
and resources of all the major nations not accused of crimes
and misdemeanors. Hence, the abolition of the veto would
have significance only if this second step were taken— spe-
cifically, if the United States were willing to permit the United
Nations, by a majority vote, to call into action American
armed forces, even at a time when its representatives had
voted against the action.
Those who advocate the abolition or mitigation of the
veto as the solution to all our problems must, I think, first
make reasonably sure that the American people are prepared
— as I am sure they were not five years ago— to accept such
an arrangement.
The abolition or modification of the veto provision requires
an amendment of the Charter, and such an amendment can be-
come effective only if two-thirds of the member states agree
to it and if that majority includes the concurrent votes of all
the permanent members of the Security Council. This fact
has led some advocates of strengthening the United Nations
to devise a proposal based on the idea of getting around the
veto. Specifically, it is proposed that a pact supplementary to
the Charter be negotiated and that its signatories obligate
themselves to consider an attack on any one of them as an
attack on itself and to come to the assistance of the state
attacked. This obligation would come into effect when a de-
termination that an attack had taken place is made, either by
the Security Council under its present procedures or by a two-
thirds vote of the General Assembly, provided that the As-
sembly's vote includes the concurrence of at least three of the
five permanent members of the Security Council.
This proposal again involves the fundamental issue that
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I have just mentioned in connection with the abolition of the
veto. By adhering to such a pact, the United States would
have to accept the obligation to use its forces and resources
on the decision of other nations, in the event that it happened
to be one of the two major nations voting in the negative on
the action to be taken. I shall not stop to discuss the many
great difficulties that this proposal presents, but I should like
to make this observation. In the two regional security pacts
into which the United States recently entered— the Rio
Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty— this country refused
to accept a situation in which its forces and resources could
be used for collective action, except on its own decision. I
sometimes wonder what reason the proponents of this idea
have for believing that this country would be willing to give
a majority of the United Nations the kind of authority that
it has so far denied to the other twenty American republics
and to the other eleven members of the North Atlantic group.
There are several other proposals focussed primarily on a
search for means of eliminating the veto. Some of them go
beyond the two already described in that they would call for
an extension of the scope of authority to be exercised by the
United Nations without the veto limitations. Some of these
involve the power to regulate armaments and armed forces
;
some involve the authority to settle international disputes and
to enforce the decisions. The considerations I have just out-
lined in connection with the other two proposals apply with
even greater force to these more drastic plans.
The vast amount of discussion that centers on the veto
question and the numerous proposals for improving the func-
tioning of the United Nations by eliminating or mitigating
the veto privilege represent, in my opinion, an attack on the
symptom rather than the disease. That disease is rooted in the
general state of world affairs, and especially in the current pro-
found split among the major nations, rather than in any
structural features of the United Nations. In any event, the
veto provision cannot be altered so long as the split exists, and
I venture to predict that, if the Soviet Union ever embarks
upon a course of policy and action that will make it possible to
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heal the split, there will be little occasion for spending time
and energy on the veto question.
There is another group of proposals that go even further.
They involve the transformation of the United Nations into
a system of world government, either on a federal or unitary
basis. These proposals are not new. When we were working
on the Charter of the United Nations, some highly articulate
groups urged upon us the idea that the principle of voluntary
association should be abandoned in favor of the principle of
supernational government. There was a time when this pres-
sure became sufficiently strong to make unnecessary for Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to reassure the country
that we were not seeking a system of supergovernment, for
at that time, the principal effects of the pressure were to
arouse widespread fears that the United States might be led
into an organization based on the supergovernment principle.
Those who worked on the Charter were convinced that the
real issue was not between the relative merits of the two basic
principles of organization. The real issue was whether it was
possible to create any kind of a world organization to which
all of the peace-seeking nations, and especially the major
nations, would be willing to adhere. It was felt that if the
world government idea had been put on the agenda of inter-
national negotiations, no success was likely to emerge.
But apart from the question whether the creation of a
system of world government is feasible, desirable, or even
likely to do what its proponents claim for it— if I had the
time I should have liked nothing better than to give you my
reasons for believing that it is none of these— what again
concerns me at this moment is whether the American people
would or should enter into an arrangement in which the na-
tion's armed forces and resources could be used without its
consent. And let us remember that a world government
system would have to mean much more than that. It would
involve the right of such a government to conscript American
citizens, to tax American citizens, to regulate immigration, to
bring an American citizen before a world court, and to do a
great many other things that would need to be done if such
{88}
a government were to function. The proponents of the scheme
assure us that all they were thinking of is a world government
endowed with defined and limited powers to maintain inter-
national peace and security. I am afraid that no matter how
much you "define" or how much you "limit" the powers of a
world government called upon to perform the tasks involved,
there would be precious little left that would be really sub-
stantial of the powers now possessed by the government of
the United States or of any other country entering into such
a system.
There are some proponents of change who urge the estab-
lishment of regional governments on the federal principle. The
most prominent of these is the scheme for a North Atlantic
federation. The same arguments apply from the point of view
of American participation as in the case of a world govern-
ment, and the same problems are presented for decision to
the people of the United States.
VI
There is one point of crucial importance that I should like
to note in connection with all of these proposals. They all
concentrate on machinery of government and machinery of
relations among nations rather than on the underlying pro-
cesses of organized society. They are all based on the idea that
if we could only find the right machinery, everything else
would take care of itself.
I do not deny, of course, that machinery is extremely im-
portant in social organization, whether on a national, a re-
gional, or a world scale. But it ought to be clear that no
machinery of government can function effectively unless back
of it are the proper attitudes and human relationships neces-
sary to its successful functioning.
Looking back over the post-war years, it seems clear to me
that there is plenty of machinery in the world to make peace
and security living realities, if only there were back of that
machinery a real determination to make it work. Details —
in some cases important ones — can and should be perfected
as experience points the way. The United Nations Charter
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was never intended to be a fixed and inflexible instrument. On
the contrary, a conscious effort was made to make it an instru-
ment capable of development and growth. The Charter itself
provides for periodic reviews of the operations of the United
Nations. It was originally thought that such a review might
not be necessary for ten years. Perhaps events have moved
so speedily as to make such a review advisable in the near
future, if for no other reason than to clarify the basic under-
lying issues that are now so badly distorted and confused.
But it seems to me that tinkering with the machinery of
international organization as a means of solving the grave and
perilous problems that confront us is merely an attempt to
escape from the stubborn realities of the world in which we
live. The most stubborn of those realities is that there is no
easy way out. Not mechanical panaceas, but patience, hard
work, ingenuity, moral and physical strength, and the will
to use that strength to preserve what free men prize most,
offer the only hope that mankind will win through the terrible
difficulties with which it is now faced.
I am convinced that mankind could confidently face the
future with what we now have by way of international ma-
chinery if the qualities I have just enumerated were to guide
our efforts and if the nations of the world were to give evi-
dence of being actuated by only a small degree of the spirit
of tolerance, accommodation, respect for each other, and
willingness to accept responsibility that would be necessary
to the functioning of the ambitious new machinery that is
being so dazzlingly dangled before us. As matters stand today,
the diversion of our energies and enthusiasm into an advocacy
of these ambitious schemes makes the present tremendously
difficult tasks even more difficult. I am very much afraid that,
if we go much further along this path, we may well find our-
selves in the process of dropping the bone to chase the shadow.
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